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Abstract 
 
 While production process moves are more prevalent than ever, there have mostly 
been studies that look at the “what”, “why”, and “where” of a move (Chen et al. 2015; 
Cohen et al. 2016; Wu and Zhang 2014; Simchi – Levi 2012; Sirkin et al. 2014). Little 
research examines the “how” of a move.  After a firm decides to move their production 
process, how do they do it in a way that will minimize downtime and allow them to 
achieve their pre-move performance quickly?  Based on in depth discussions with 
multinational companies who have undergone production moves, my dissertation focuses 
on the transfer of production knowledge. Specifically, the dissertation is organized into 
three essays. 
The first essay focuses on template use and its link to performance.  A template 
can be described as a working example of organizational routines that contains both 
critical and noncritical elements of the routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Using 
behavioral experiments in which 4-person teams put together complex building devices, I 
demonstrate that template use leads to improved performance vs. not using templates at 
all. However, I also show that strict template use, without the ability for teams to adjust 
the process, leads to reduced performance.  
Building on the results of the first essay, the second investigates the role of 
functional diversity in enhancing/eroding knowledge transfer effectiveness when using 
templates. Functional diversity is defined as the extent to which education, experience 
and expertise of team members across different teams vary (Jehn, 1999). Through the 
creation of an experiment in which I have production knowledge being transferred 
between subjects with either a Business or Engineering background, I find the results to 
be contextual. When transferring the process from Business to Engineering, functional 
diversity leads to reduced performance, likely due to a lack of credibility given to the 
Business teams by the Engineers. However, when knowledge is transferred from the 
Engineers to Business teams, functional diversity performance is in line with “within 
function” results.  
Lastly, the third essay looks at the role that national culture plays in a firm’s 
ability to transfer knowledge between countries that have unique cultures. I create an 
 v 
experiment that involves knowledge transfer within and between teams located in two 
important, yet unique countries: United States and China.  I also examine if collocating 
members of the source team with the recipient team members mitigates the impact of 
national culture. The results show that transferring knowledge between unique cultures 
leads to reduced performance vs. transferring knowledge within similar cultures. In 
addition, colocation is a successful strategy to employ for the Chinese recipient teams, 
while it has no effect on U.S. team performance.   
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Chapter 1  
Dissertation Overview 
Changing customer demand, increasing production costs, and emerging growth 
opportunities often generate pressure on firms to relocate their production processes.  
Although it would be ideal if manufacturing plants were be built on barges so that they 
could be moved from place to place quickly and without resistance, moving a process is a 
disruptive affair that involves learning and adaptation. Every process move risks an 
insufficient pace of learning and an incomplete adaptation of the process to local 
environments. The pressure to move a process in response to a changing economic 
landscape must be clearly weighed against the disruption and risk such a move implies to 
the firm’s own processes and to the value chain the firm is embedded in. Further, actively 
managing this disruption by effectively transferring knowledge between a source and 
recipient site is clearly an important task for operations managers. 
 There are many examples of firms choosing to move production to improve their 
competitive position. In the 1990s, firms such as Apple, Hewlett Packard, Procter and 
Gamble all moved production of key products to contract manufacturers in China to take 
advantage of low labor costs in the area. More recently, General Electric made the 
decision to move production of turbines and generators from the U.S. to Europe and 
China, in order to secure the necessary export financing required by their customers (GE 
press release, September 15, 2015). Numerous reports, including those done by the 
Boston Consulting Group (2012), MIT (2012), Chen et al. (2015) and Cohen et al. (2016) 
show that many firms are actively moving their processes or seriously considering a 
move, indicating that production process moves remain a current and frequent 
phenomenon (The Economist, January 2013). 
 While process moves continue to happen, there is little research in the field of 
operations management examining this phenomenon. Within my dissertation, I study 
production process moves and knowledge management – creation, transfer and retention - 
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via behavioral laboratory experiments. Behavioral experiments allow me to better 
examine causality when looking for the link between the various independent and 
dependent variables.  Experiments by themselves do not prove theory, but coupled with 
field studies and other research, experiments can strengthen/weaken the confidence we 
have in the existing theory (Siemsen, 2011). My research addresses the following 
question: What factors impact performance during/after a production move and how can 
firms effectively transfer process knowledge? 
 
Figure 1.1 Dissertation Structure 
 
 In chapter two, “Production Process Moves: Template Use and the Need to 
Adapt”, I begin my investigation of production process moves by studying template use 
as a way in which firms may effectively be able to create, transfer and retain knowledge.  
The merits of template use have been discussed within the strategic management 
literature over the last few decades (Winter & Szulanski, 2001; Jensen and Szulanski 
2007; Szulanski and Jensen 2008). These papers demonstrate that there is value in using 
templates. However, they gather data in a services context within a fairly stable 
environment. In my study, I focus on template use in a production context, and I 
introduce product change, because many firms use a process move as an opportunity to 
also make scheduled changes to their product. Ultimately, I conducted two studies.  In the 
first study, the research question is: Does template use lead to higher performance when 
transferring production process knowledge? Through a series of experiments where 4 
person teams worked together to build complex devices, I find that template use does 
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lead to higher performance, especially when the source and recipient contexts are similar. 
Based on results from the first study, I conducted a second study to see if there were 
boundary conditions to the positive impact template use has on performance during a 
production process move.  I asked the following question: Does rigidly enforcing a 
template result in adverse behavioral consequences at the recipient site? I find that rigidly 
enforcing a template reduces performance, likely due to the reduction in the sense of 
ownership and ultimately motivation on behalf of the production teams involved. Similar 
to the literature on motivation and empowerment (Bernstein 2012; Zhang and Barton 
2010; Mathieu et al. 2006), I find that allowing production teams to play a role in crafting 
their work leads to desired results. 
 It is common within organizations for work to be done by workers in a team. 
Naturally, there has been much debate within firms as well as within the academic 
literature on how to structure these teams (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992). Should the team 
have members with similar or diverse functional backgrounds? The usual form of 
diversity discussed in the literature is within team diversity, because the work is usually 
being done within the same business unit/department/work group, regardless of whether 
the people are geographically close or far.  But when considering a production process 
move, it may involve a transfer from one business unit to another, one subsidiary to 
another, or even from one company to another. Therefore, different teams are involved in 
the transfer. This context requires a discussion of between team diversity, rather than the 
typical discussion of within team diversity. My second essay, titled, “Functional 
Diversity and its Impact on Knowledge Transfer Effectiveness” addresses this gap by 
focusing on between team diversity and how it impacts performance. The research 
question is:  Does between team functional diversity impact the effectiveness of a proven 
template when transferring process knowledge? 
  My first essay shows that template use leads to a higher learning rate during 
knowledge transfer. In my second essay, I want to better understand if functional 
diversity between the source and recipient teams will enhance, hinder or have no effect 
on transfer performance. I draw on several papers in past literature to help motivate my 
research and the past results are mixed regarding functional diversity and its impact. 
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Ancona and Caldwell (1992) finds that functional diversity leads to increased 
communication between team members, however they find a negative overall effect of 
functional diversity. They find that that innovation increases but functional diversity 
“impedes implementation because there is less capability for teamwork than there is for 
homogenous teams.” Conversely, Jehn et al. (1999) finds that while diversity leads to 
increased conflict between team members, it increases overall productivity. Sampson 
(2007) studies R&D collaborations, so it is one of the only papers that is interested in 
between team diversity.  They argue for a low level of functional diversity and ultimately 
demonstrate that a moderate level works best. 
 In the second essay, through a series of experiments in which Business 
and Engineering school students are transferring production knowledge within and 
between their function, the results are contextual, similar to Sampson (2007).  When 
knowledge is transferred from Business to Engineering, there is an initial performance 
reduction, likely due to a lack of credibility given to the Business teams by the Engineers. 
However, when knowledge is transferred from the Engineers to Business teams, 
functional diversity performance is in line with the “within function” results. Taken 
together, the results show that functional diversity is not a cure all for team related work, 
and that managers should employ this approach carefully. 
While the role of national culture has been studied previously, there has been very 
little investigation into national culture and its impact on performance within a 
production environment. So in my third essay, titled “National Culture and its Impact on 
Knowledge Transfer Effectiveness”, I investigate the following research questions: 1.) 
Does National Culture matter when moving a production process from one culture to 
another, and, 2.) If National Culture matters, what strategies can be implemented by 
managers to neutralize these effects? There are several studies (Bhagat et al. 2002; 
Javidan et al. 2005; Ozer et al. 2014; Hofstede 1980, 2010) from the past that look at 
national culture and how it may impact knowledge transfer/sharing that guide my 
research in this area. Bhagat et al. (2002) offers a number of theoretical propositions, 
arguing that individualist (e.g. U.S.) cultures value explicit knowledge, while collectivist 
cultures (e.g. China) value tacit knowledge. They also argue that knowledge will move 
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faster within culture than in cross culture transfers. Javidan et. al. (2005), through the 
explanation of a cross cultural case study, demonstrate the difficulty in moving 
knowledge across cultures.  They argue that knowledge transfer within culture is difficult 
enough, so when an extra layer of difficulty is introduced, that makes it much harder to 
do successfully.  Their advice is that executives should take a “proactive and systematic 
approach to dealing with cultural differences”. In Ozer et al. 2014, the authors, through 
experiments between Chinese and U.S. students, find cultural differences in how each 
culture exhibits trust and shares information. They argue that the lack of trust the Chinese 
subjects show is due to their cultural upbringing. Hofstede (1980, 2010) spent years 
(1967-1973) gathering data from IBM employees across 70 countries. Through this 
research, he proposed several dimensions (individualism/collectivism, power distance, 
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance) that help explain the similarities and differences 
among people from different countries.  
Within the third essay, through a series of experiments in the United States as 
well as in Shanghai, China, I find that national culture does matter. The cross-cultural 
knowledge transfer performance is lower than within culture performance. I also find that 
U.S. teams perform better than their Chinese counterparts, which is what we would 
expect based on the propositions from Bhagat et al. (2002) regarding how individualists 
value explicit knowledge more than collectivist. I also find that collocating a member of 
the source team with the Chinese recipient teams leads to far better performance than 
when collocation is not present. This is also consistent with Bhagat et al.’s theory on the 
value collectivists place on tacit knowledge. Taken together, the results from this essay 
show that national culture must be considered when firms are transferring production 
knowledge within and between cultures.  
 Collectively, this dissertation provides a comprehensive investigation of 
knowledge creation, transfer and retention and how firms can create strategy to increase 
the chances of a successful production process move. The goal of this research is to 
deepen the understanding of production process moves so that firms engaged in them can 
create winning strategies. In addition, this research will help form a foundation that future 
researchers can build upon when they are investigating the “how” of a move.  I 
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empirically demonstrate factors that lead to knowledge transfer effectiveness, as well as 
factors that may impede a firm’s ability to transfer vital production knowledge. 
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Chapter 2:  
 
Production Process Moves: Template Use 
and the Need to Adapt 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Changing customer demand, increasing production costs, and emerging growth 
opportunities often generate pressure on firms to relocate their production processes. 
Although it would be ideal if manufacturing plants could be relocated quickly and easily, 
moving a process is disruptive and involves coping with a new learning curve to ramp-up 
production. Every process move risks an insufficient pace of learning and an incomplete 
adaptation of the process to the local environment. The pressure to relocate in response to 
a changing economic landscape must be weighed against the disruption and risk to the 
firm’s own processes and to the value chain in which the firm is embedded. Further, 
actively managing this disruption by effectively transferring knowledge between a source 
and recipient site is an important task for operations managers. 
Consider the example of Mabuchi Motors. The company approached one of its 
major customers, Procter & Gamble (P&G), about moving its production of motors for 
two of P&G’s major Swiffer products from China to Vietnam. The decision to move the 
process was made in response to increasing production costs in China. P&G objected to 
the move because both product lines were in a growth phase, and P&G management did 
not want to risk any manufacturing disruptions. However, Mabuchi was the sole supplier 
of these specific motors to P&G. As a result, P&G had little leverage in the subsequent 
negotiations. Mabuchi projected that it would take six months to begin production in 
Vietnam, an estimate that encompassed closing Chinese operations, moving the 
equipment, and recruiting and training a new workforce in Vietnam. However, after 12 
months — six months past the originally scheduled start-up — Mabuchi was still 
encountering high defect and scrap rates on the Vietnam motor line. The consequent lack 
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of motors was beginning to threaten P&G’s ability to deliver the finished products. 
Ultimately, although Mabuchi had produced the motors in China for more than 10 years 
without problems, the company was unable to effectively transfer this capability to 
Vietnam. The failure of this relocation of production was in large part due to Mabuchi 
underestimating the difficulty of capturing knowledge at the source location and 
transferring it to the recipient site. The company also underestimated the costs and 
planning necessary for the proper implementation of the production process at the 
recipient facility (see e.g. Gaimon et al. 2011). As a result, P&G executives were forced 
to qualify an alternate source for this component and eventually dropped Mabuchi as 
their supplier. 
As this example highlights, the increasing production costs in China are currently 
a force driving the movement of production processes. Several U.S. companies with 
operations in China are either moving their production farther inland there, back to the 
United States or to Mexico, or to regions with still lower labor costs. In a survey of 
American manufacturing companies by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) in 2012, 37% 
of firms with over $1 billion in annual sales and 48% of firms with over $10 billion in 
annual sales were planning to or were already in the middle of moving production from 
China back to the United States. The primary reason given for this shift was the dramatic 
increase in labor costs in China since 2000, an increase estimated at between 7.1% and 
7.8% per year. Similar studies by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (The 
Economist, January 2013) and Wharton (Chen et al. 2015; Cohen et al. 2016) found a 
great deal of production process movement in and out of China. The movement was 
driven by several reasons, including proximity to demand, market changes, and 
innovation, i.e., a desire to move manufacturing closer to a firm’s research and 
development center (Gray et al. 2015, Cohen et al. 2016). Moving a process is not a rare 
and unusual event; rather it is a normal change affecting global supply chains. 
Although these process moves occur regularly in practice, little research has been 
done in operations management (OM) to examine this phenomenon, especially how firms 
can achieve their desired process move outcomes. In our study, we apply a behavioral 
lens to this topic. Although production process moves are complex and multidimensional 
 9 
organizational events, at their core lies an exercise in effective knowledge management 
(creation, transfer, and retention) and task understanding. Both undertakings lend 
themselves to behavioral research. When psychologists first studied learning curves, they 
turned to laboratory experiments to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon 
(Ebbinghaus, 1885; Thorndike 1898; Thurstone 1919). Field studies later confirmed their 
findings (e.g., Wright, 1936; Hirch, 1952; Argote and Epple, 1990; Darr et al. 1995). We 
thus believe that using laboratory experiments is a useful point of departure for further 
OM research in this domain. Prior experimental research has also studied complex 
organizational phenomena, such as Weber and Camerer (2003), who examine the effect 
of culture on mergers and acquisitions with a series of laboratory experiments involving 
teams of three people. 
A key aspect of process moves we study is whether the use of templates during a 
move can create more effective knowledge transfer. Nelson and Winter (1982) described 
a template as a working example of organizational routines that contains both critical and 
noncritical elements of the routines. These various elements “provide the details of how 
the work gets done, in what sequence and how various components and subroutines are 
interconnected” (Nelson and Winter 1982, pp. 119-120). In a real-world manufacturing 
context, Intel has become known for its Copy Exactly technology transfer method, which 
can be thought of as a very strict form of template use. Semiconductor manufacturing has 
very complex process flows with tight tolerances. The Copy Exactly method was 
developed to accelerate technology transfer while maintaining expected product quality 
and yields. The philosophy is that “everything which might affect the process, or how it 
is run is to be copied down to the finest details, unless it is either physically impossible to 
do so, or there is an overwhelming competitive benefit to introducing a change” 
(McDonald 1998, page 2). 
Several papers in the strategic management literature have demonstrated that 
template use is an effective way to transfer knowledge and achieve desired results in the 
context of franchise replication (Darr et al. 1995, Winter and Szulanski 2001, Jensen and 
Szulanski 2007, Szulanski and Jensen 2008, Winter et al. 2012). The primary reason for 
studying this setting is that “franchise organizations provide a natural laboratory for the 
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study of replication as they compete primarily through the creation and operations of a 
large number of very similar outlets according to a uniform business model” (Szulanski 
and Jensen, 2008, p. 1734); hence, little to no variation. This level of uniformity is 
counter to how we conceptualize production moves, because each production 
environment may vary greatly in terms of product/technology mix, labor skills, suppliers, 
and climate. 
Although the strict use of templates for knowledge transfer has its supporters, 
template use has also been shown to restrict search, thereby prohibiting a knowledge 
recipient from effectively adapting new knowledge to the local environment (Victorino et 
al. 2013) or having rapidly diminishing returns in the new environment (Szulanski and 
Jensen, 2008). Do the advantages of template use outweigh the disadvantages? Not using 
a template, also referred to as local adaptation, may be an advantageous approach if 
recipients of the process require a clean slate to enable them to search for ways to adapt a 
process to a local environment. 
 Consider the example of West Pharmaceutical Services, Inc., a $1B+ 
manufacturer of rubber and plastic components. Its managers saw a need to deviate from 
an established template in moving a process from the United States to Mexico. West was 
supplying jars and closures for P&G’s Vicks VapoRub brand. P&G’s managers told West 
of their intention to move all of their major suppliers closer to their Naucalpan, Mexico, 
plant. West had been manufacturing its supplies for P&G in New Jersey, so this request 
meant moving production out of the country if West hoped to retain this current business 
with P&G. Essentially, West was faced with the Greenfield vs. Brownfield dilemma that 
many firms face when moving a process (Gaimon et al. 2017). Do they build a new 
facility from the ground up (Greenfield), which would enable them to design specifically 
for the intended use? Or do they upgrade/adapt an existing facility (Brownfield), which 
would take less time and allow them to leverage current employees? Since West already 
had a plant in Mexico (Cuernavaca) capable of just-in-time delivery of products with 
only a short lead-time, they employed a Brownfield approach. However, this plant lacked 
the technological capability to absorb a sophisticated injection blow molding process, and 
thus changes to the process were necessary. 
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 To adapt the process to fit the skills and capabilities available at the facility in 
Mexico, West’s managers put together a cross-functional team composed of key 
personnel (research and development, engineering, manufacturing, etc.), including 
managers from the Mexican facility. This team recommended that West should buy new 
equipment and molds instead of moving the old equipment, because the updated 
technology was more aligned with the new business requirements. However, instead of 
shipping the new equipment directly to Mexico, West’s managers had the new equipment 
delivered to their technical headquarters in the United States. There, the cross-functional 
team, which had members with injection blow molding expertise, could qualify the 
process and train the personnel from Mexico who would be using the new equipment. 
This was an example of learning before doing vs. learning by doing (Sommer and Loch, 
2004). Because of West’s ability to thus adapt its established process template, the 
company could qualify the process in Mexico on time and at cost for its customer. This 
enabled West not only to keep its current business, but also to position itself for 
additional growth. The example highlights that simply replicating an existing template 
may often not be the right approach for a successful process transfer; changing 
environmental conditions may necessitate process adaptations. 
Another consideration in the use of templates is their potential to erode the sense 
of ownership in the process at a recipient site. If a template is designed at the source and 
handed to the recipient without any opportunity for the recipient to influence the template, 
organizational resistance toward the template can arise quickly. Defects and 
inefficiencies will be blamed on the template, and the drive to root out such waste will be 
diminished. Employees involved will see their input as purely transactional; their 
motivation to excel in the process may suffer as a result. Rigid templates will ensure 
better knowledge transfer and standardization, but may also have behavioral 
consequences at the recipient site by lowering the intrinsic motivation to work and 
improve the process. To that point, Mathieu et al. (2006) and Zhang and Bartol, (2010) 
showed that psychological empowerment, which can be characterized as having a sense 
of perceived control, perceived competence, and internalization of the goals and 
objectives of the organization (Menon et al. 1999), leads to increased employee creativity, 
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customer satisfaction, and quantitative performance. As Jaikumar and Bohn (1992) point 
out, within a static environment, it is assumed that all production technology is known 
and therefore, the only role of labor would be to simply execute the procedures specified 
by management. But firms today exist in a dynamic world in which production should be 
evolving and process improvement, with the help of those working in the production 
environment, should have high priority. 
In summary, we pursue two research questions in our work. First, we ask whether 
and when templates lead to improved performance after a production process move, 
given that conditions at the source and recipient sites may not exactly match. Second, we 
ask whether rigidly enforcing a template results in adverse behavioral consequences at 
the recipient site. Our results from two behavioral experiments address these questions. 
Our first behavioral experiment involved 57 four-person teams, with each team working 
to assemble a device five times over. Some teams received a template for guidance, and 
some did not receive such a template. Further, some teams worked on exactly the product 
that the template was designed for, but others worked with the same template but on a 
slightly different product. In our second experiment, which involved an additional 30 
four-person teams, all teams worked with a template they were not allowed to modify 
when building the product. Data from this experiment was compared with data from our 
first experiment in which teams could modify their process and deviate from the template 
after the experiment had started. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we examine the 
relevant literature. In Section 3 we present Study I and provide the theory, experimental 
design, analysis and results. In Section 4, we present Study II, including theory, the 
experimental design, analysis and results.  In Section 5, we conclude by highlighting the 
strategic and operational implications of this study, its limitations, and explore future 
research directions. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Organizational Learning and Learning Curves 
Organizational learning theory is well developed, (see Argote, 2013 for a complete 
literature review) with contributions from numerous academic areas like organizational 
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behavior, economics, strategy, psychology, and information systems. A complete review 
of this literature is beyond the scope of our work, but this stream of research contains 
several studies that deliver important insights for our current research context. 
Argote et al. (1990) analyzed the persistence of learning in a manufacturing 
environment as well as the transfer of knowledge across production facilities within the 
same organization. Before their study, it was assumed that manufacturing costs continue 
to decrease at a decreasing rate as long as more volume (experience) is being made, 
irrespective of time. By using data from the builders of the World War II era Liberty 
ships, the authors found that learning depreciates rapidly if not replenished with a steady 
stream of volume. In fact, if continued production did not replenish the stock of 
knowledge available at the beginning of a year, at year’s end only 3.2% of the knowledge 
would remain. They also showed that if volume drops by a significant amount (e.g., 50%), 
the cost or defect rate would increase before eventually decreasing again. This study also 
found that of the 16 active Liberty shipyards, those built later benefited from the 
knowledge accrued by the earlier ones, but this learning benefit depreciated rapidly. 
Analyzing a more detailed dataset on the Liberty ships construction collected from the 
U.S. National Archives, Thompson (2007) found that organizational forgetting is not 
quite as forceful as estimated by Argote et al. (1990), though still present in the data. 
Taken together, these findings highlight the difficulty of transferring knowledge between 
production environments, even when they are very similar, as well as how difficult it can 
be to retain knowledge (de Holan and Phillips 2004; Argote et al. 2003). 
Epple et al. (1991) examined the hypothesis that acquired knowledge can be 100% 
contained in technology. They analyzed this question by gathering data on knowledge 
transfer across shifts in a plant, the idea being that if knowledge can be completely 
captured with technology, its transfer across shifts should be complete because the shifts 
both use the same technology. Using data from a large North American truck plant, the 
authors found that although much of the knowledge was transferred via technology in the 
expansion of production from one to two shifts, knowledge transfer remained incomplete. 
This rejects the hypothesis that technology can fully capture operational knowledge. A 
large investment in training was made before moving to two shifts; this investment in the 
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plant workers was vital to a successful transfer of knowledge from one shift to two. When 
compared with Argote et al. (1990), these results suggest that intra-plant transfer of 
knowledge is easier than the transfer between production facilities that are geographically 
separate (Epple et al. 1991). This finding alludes to the “stickiness” of knowledge — that 
is, the difficulty of moving knowledge in and between organizations (von Hippel, 1994; 
Szulanski 2002). 
Lapre and van Wassenhove (2001) analyzed organizational learning by studying 
knowledge transfer data from Bekaert, a multinational steel corporation. Bekaert’s 
managers wanted to induce increased learning at multiple locations by replicating a high 
performing production line (Model Line A or MLA). They created three additional lines, 
MLB, MLC1, and MLC2, but could not match the results found with MLA. The authors 
concluded that a learning rate is not a given constant but a dependent variable largely 
influenced by management. With the three replicated lines, Bekaert’s managers failed to 
provide the necessary amount of experience, expertise, and focus when they assigned 
people to the replicated lines. It was this failure that led to reduced performance (total 
factor productivity) in moving from MLA to MLB, MLC1, and MLC2. 
Template Use in Knowledge Transfer 
Several studies in the fields of strategy show that template use can lead to successful 
knowledge transfer (Winter and Szulanski 2001, Jiang et al. 2004, Jensen and Szulanski 
2007, Szulanski and Jensen 2008, Winter et al. 2012). For example, in Winter & 
Szulanski (2001), the authors expressed a need for firms’ managers to think more 
strategically when seeking to expand via replication. They argued that managers at many 
firms, as well as organizational theorists, think of replication as simply a reapplication of 
a known formula and underestimate the difficulty they face when seeking to add 
locations. They articulated a theory that in their view recognizes managers’ effort to 
create a business model to transfer, all the while dealing with the issues that crop up 
during knowledge transfer. Ultimately, they proposed the strict use of templates to ensure 
that the knowledge transfer portion of replication is successful. They asserted that “when 
guided by a template, the exploitation of a business model by replication is more 
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effective and profitable when replication tactics rely on an initial effort to copy the 
template precisely” (Winter and Szulanski 2001, page 737). 
 In Jensen and Szulanski (2007), the authors’ goal was to empirically study the 
claim that template use enhances performance during knowledge transfer. They 
conducted an eight-year case study that included a repeated quasi-experiment within 
Xerox Europe. On three separate occasions, the company’s managers had wanted to 
transfer sets of best practices to its sales force. The authors studied template use as their 
independent variable; their dependent variables were adoption and performance (sales 
force productivity, ratio of selling costs to revenue, etc.). Their key result was that in two 
cases (Wave I and Wave III), there was a high adoption of the prescribed template, and 
the results after implementation far exceeded initial expectations. Wave II did not use a 
template, and adoption of best practices was low (40%) and deemed a failure. The 
authors concluded that template use and knowledge transfer effectiveness are positively 
correlated. 
 Although these past studies demonstrate that template use leads to better 
performance, they differ from our current study along several dimensions.  First, apart 
from the two studies that focus on Intel (McDonald 1998; Terwiesch and Xu 2004), 
previous studies have predominantly examined service and not manufacturing 
environments. Although the results from these studies may apply in a manufacturing 
environment as well, testing the use of templates in the production of products could 
yield different results. While service environments are characterized by heterogeneity – 
i.e. individual units of production being unique (Sampson and Froehle 2006) – 
manufacturing environments tend to have more standardized outputs, and they are 
therefore more amenable to a precise set of specifications. Further, service processes 
usually involve direct interaction with customers, whereas manufacturing contexts are 
removed from customers. This creates less opportunity for variation in the process, but 
also provides only delayed feedback as to how decisions made in the production process 
impact customers. In turn, these differences between manufacturing and service 
environments may lead to templates affecting employee behavior differently in 
manufacturing than in services. 
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Second, the level of analysis in previous research was at the firm or store unit 
level, but our study analyzes performance at the team level. This distinction is significant 
because when studying the merits of a practice like template use, it is important to get 
close to where the work is being done. In manufacturing, this occurs at the team level. 
Once we understand operations at the team level, we can better assess if the practice 
being used is effective. Then we can make educated assumptions about what that means 
at higher levels (shift, plant, and firm). If we begin by studying the broader levels, as past 
studies have done, we could miss valuable insights that tend to emerge only closer to the 
point of execution. 
Third, past studies have focused on templates in a very dichotomous way – either 
templates were or were not used. In contrast, our experiments are finer grained because 
they add a temporal dimension to the rigidity of the template: In our first experiment, 
templates must be used initially and can be altered afterward. Our second experiment 
enforces the rigid use of the template throughout the whole experiment. This allows us to 
test whether there is a difference between providing the template merely as an initial 
suggestion to transfer knowledge or as a rigid tool for process standardization instead. 
Lastly, we are looking at the role of template use in conditions of both high and 
minimal changes in environments (see next section). This is salient because the 
previously mentioned studies looked at template use in a familiar environment, noting 
that franchise organizations provide a natural laboratory for the study of replication 
because they compete primarily through the creation and operation of many very similar 
outlets (Winter et al. 2012, p. 674). Appropriate to that point, Victorino et al. (2013) 
empirically showed in an individual service task (service scripting in hotels) that in a 
state of high change, template use leads to lower performance; we wanted to examine if 
this reduced effectiveness of templates holds true in the setting of a manufacturing team 
as well. 
Environmental and Technological Change 
Production moves are unique because although there may be an implied expansion of 
business, they largely involve moving current business, which is riskier than growing 
through replication/expansion; be it new shipyards (Argote et al 1990), increased 
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numbers of manufacturing lines (Lapré and Wassenhove 2001), or new small office/home 
office stores (Szulanski and Jensen, 2008; Winter et al. 2012). Viewed from this 
perspective, it is crucial to execute a process move well; if not, the existing business is at 
risk, and there is little redundancy that may mitigate this risk in case of unexpected 
challenges. In addition, a move often means organizational change in which the people 
originally responsible for a process are no longer managing the process after the move 
(and they possibly lose their jobs). Some form of external pressure (e.g., competitive 
response, governmental mandates, and customer requests) typically drives a decision to 
change. Thus, a process move implies some form of environmental change and 
adaptation.  
We view change as an important factor to study for several reasons. First, no 
company operates in a static environment; a consistent need for change is always present 
because of government regulations, competition, consumer preferences, etc. Secondly, as 
the West Pharma example demonstrates, many companies regard a process move as an 
opportunity to change the product and/or process itself, either because it is time to do so 
in the product’s lifecycle or for strategic reasons (e.g., cost, consumer preferences, 
customer mandate, competitive response). Further, the new location may require 
changing suppliers (because of transportation costs or local content rules) or the 
technology itself (e.g., because of differences in barometric pressure). Lastly, it has been 
demonstrated that implementing process change, if coupled with preparation and training 
(and template use is a specific form of training), can lead to long-term revenue growth via 
reduced unit cost and/or premium product price (Carrillo and Gaimon, 2000). Our goal is 
to examine if environmental change affects the effectiveness of a template in the transfer 
of knowledge from a source to a recipient. 
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2.3.  Study 1 – The Effect of Using a Template 
The focus of our first study was to analyze the impact of using a template when 
transferring knowledge within both low- and high-change environments. Four-person 
teams must assemble a device five times over. Some teams received a template, and some 
did not. All teams could adjust their production process between rounds. 
2.3.1 Theory 
Previously, the use of templates during knowledge transfer had been primarily studied in 
the field of strategy. Szulanski and Jensen (2008) examined the merits of template use in 
a low change setting, as it related to franchisor network growth in new countries. They 
gathered panel data from one U.S-based firm (Mailboxes, Etc.), which sells master 
licenses to outside companies; this has resulted in franchise networks in 23 countries. The 
researchers’ goal was to address two questions: “to what extent is such a strategy of 
‘copying more exactly’ efficacious in the cross-border transfer of knowledge; and if such 
a positive effect exists, how persistent is it?” Using network growth as the dependent 
variable and copying more exactly as the independent variable, they did not find support 
for their hypothesis favoring local adaptation. However, they did find support for a 
hypothesis favoring a copy more exactly strategy as well as support for an assertion that 
following this strategy has a diminishing impact over time. These findings, which are 
consistent with other literature in this domain, suggest that knowledge transferred 
precisely from headquarters may be more valuable than wisdom that comes from local 
units and that introducing innovation may cause abandonment of the knowledge that 
made the franchise successful in the first place. This knowledge from the source leads to 
higher initial performance, although the authors argue that the impact of the transferred 
knowledge wanes over time. 
 A different stream of research looks at mental models and their impact on team 
performance. Mental models can be defined as a “mechanism whereby humans generate 
descriptions of system purpose and form, explanations of system functioning and 
observed system states, and predictions of future system states” (Rouse and Morris 1986, 
p. 360). These models allow people to describe, explain, and predict events in their 
environment (Mathieu et al. 2000). Converse (1993) suggests that when individuals are 
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put in a team environment, they draw on common or shared mental models to effectively 
complete tasks. When the tasks are complex, multiple mental models must be shared 
among team members to achieve desired performance (Mathieu et al. 2000). These 
mental models include (1) technology/equipment models, where team members must 
understand how the various forms of technology/equipment interacts with each other, (2) 
job/task models, in which knowledge is organized related to how the task is accomplished 
through procedures and contingencies, (3) team interaction models that “describe the 
roles and responsibilities of team members, interaction patterns, information flow, role 
interdependencies and information sources” (Mathieu et al. 2000, page 274) and (4) the 
team Member model, which helps outline the strengths, weaknesses, tendencies and 
knowledge of the various teams members and it allows them to “tailor their behavior in 
accordance with that they expect their teammates to do” (Mathieu et al. 2000, page 274). 
These four mental models can be broadly defined in two primary content areas: task-
related features of the situation (e.g., technology/equipment and job/task models) and 
team-related elements of the situation (e.g., team interaction and team models). Mathieu 
et al. (2000) empirically shows that the existence of these mental models leads to 
improved team performance. If we look at the creation of shared mental models through 
an Input-Process-Outcome framework (Gladstein, 1984; Guzzo and Dickson, 1996, 
Mathieu et al. 2000), a well-established template serves as a key input to the creation of a 
shared mental model that teams can then use to deliver increased performance (Heffner et 
al. 1995; Volpe et al. 1996). 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate that when it comes to production moves 
being made in a low-change environment, it does not make sense to deviate from a 
proven template. Further, teams that have knowledge that allows them to describe, 
explain, and predict events in their environment will work together more effectively and 
deliver better performance. Therefore, we submit our first hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 1A: Under low product/process change, template use leads to 
higher initial performance (faster learning) after knowledge transfer, vs. 
local adaptation of the process. 
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 H1A suggests there are initial performance advantages associated with using a 
template. But do these performance advantages persist or even increase over time? To 
examine this question, Winter et al. (2012) used longitudinal data from the same 
company studied in Szulanski and Jensen (2008) and examined the “outlet specific risk of 
failure.” The independent variable of interest was a franchise outlet’s deviation from the 
franchisor template. The study’s findings suggest that certain types of deviation from the 
template (the sale of nonstandard products in this sample) increase the risk of an outlet 
going out of business. 
In Winter & Szulanski (2001, p. 737) the authors asserted that “due to differences 
in the environmental conditions, modifications introduced to adapt the established 
template may create new problems; problems that will have to be solved in situ through a 
costly process of trial and error because they cannot be solved through reference to the 
established template. This is likely to slow down profitable growth.” As shown in Winter 
et al. (2012) and Winter and Szulanski (2001), templates not only provide initial benefits, 
but these benefits remain over time. In the production teams we studied, we believe that a 
template serves as a good basis for individuals to hone their skills and for teams to learn 
how to cooperate with each other. Major process design choices are fixed through the 
template. Thus, learning can proceed faster within the team without the need to search 
and adapt the parameters of how the team works. Further, templates serve as a form of 
standardization that reduces performance variability between teams. 
Ozkan-Seely, Gaimon and Kavadias (2015, p. 177) argued that although benefits 
from knowledge development are instantaneous, benefits from knowledge transfer are 
lagged “because of the difficulties in articulating and documenting knowledge as well as 
the challenges regarding its interpretation and application.” In other words, although 
knowledge transfer may not bring initial performance advantages, the benefits of 
knowledge transfer only become apparent over time.  
To illustrate this argument, consider that learning in our context has two 
components – process learning, as decision makers figure out how to best divide the 
labor among the different production team members, and individual learning, as team 
members figure out how to better execute their allocated tasks. Using a template ‘locks’ 
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the process in earlier, enabling earlier repetition of tasks for individuals, thus enabling 
individuals to learn faster at their assigned tasks without having to alter their routines. 
Further, a proven template will lead to a more balanced division of labor within a team 
from the start, thus enabling all members of the team (and not just the bottleneck) to 
witness the impact of their performance on team outcomes, which in turn provides 
improved feedback for learning. Thus, using a template may speed up learning. Further, 
using the template will standardize performance across teams to some degree. With these 
arguments in mind, we present our next two hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 1B: Under low product/process change, template use leads to 
an increased learning rate after knowledge transfer, vs. local adaptation 
of the process. 
HYPOTHESIS 1C: Under low product/process change, template use leads to 
reduced performance variability between production teams vs. local 
adaptation of the process. 
It is intuitive that transferring knowledge through a template should lead to 
performance benefits if the template matches its destination context. However, 
production moves often imply change and the need to adapt. Will using a template in 
such changed contexts lead to less adaptation and thus decreased performance? Some 
academic argument favors deviating from an established template in a changing 
environment. Specifically, Victorino et al. (2013) analyzed the impact of service scripting 
on perceived service quality. A script is a “schematic knowledge structure held in the 
memory that specifies behavior or event sequences that are appropriate for specific 
situations” (Gioia and Poole, 1984), i.e., a type of template. They developed an 
experimental design that placed participants in either a standard service environment (e.g., 
hotel check in/checkout desk, low level of change) or a customized environment (e.g., 
hotel concierge desk, high level of change) in which participants were subject to a 
predominant, moderate, or relaxed script setting. The authors found that a relaxed script, 
when used in a customized environment, leads to higher performance. Blindly following 
a script in a customized setting might cause employees to “discount or ignore the greater 
variation in customer demands and customer signals” (Victorino et al. 2013, page 7). 
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Similarly, Winter et al. (2012), although empirically showing support for following a 
template when replicating a franchise environment, added a caveat to this result by saying 
that local adaptation should not always lead to business failure, especially when there are 
high population and cultural/institutional differences involved (Winter et. al. 2012). 
 Accordingly, some form of adaptation is needed if the recipient and source 
locations differ significantly. Such differences could be due to supplier, workforce, or 
environmental differences, or because the move is also used as an opportunity to alter the 
product. Using a template in this context may crowd out any effort by the recipient site to 
successfully adapt to change or will at least reduce the space in which recipients of the 
template are willing to search because they are anchored on the template. This leads to 
our second set of hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 2A: Under high product/process change, template use leads 
to lower initial performance (learning) after knowledge transfer, vs. local 
adaptation of the process. 
HYPOTHESIS 2B: Under high product/process change, template use leads 
to lower performance (slower learning rate) over time after knowledge 
transfer, vs. local adaptation of the process. 
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2.3.2 Experimental Design 
Operationalizing a Production Process and Template Use Condition  
We used Lego building sets in our experiment to simulate a production process. There is 
a history of Lego building sets being used in academic laboratory research. In Reddy and 
Byrnes (1972), the researchers used “The Lego Man: A decision-making and problem-
solving exercise” to show that when groups of middle managers were more compatible, 
they completed a Lego building task more rapidly than less compatible groups. In Ariely 
et al. (2008), the authors, via a Lego building exercise, showed that when subjects could 
see their finished work accumulate versus it being disassembled over time, they were far 
more productive. Norton et al. (2011) investigated the presence of the “IKEA effect” – 
the increase in valuation of self-made products. The authors sought to establish boundary 
conditions for this effect; so through building IKEA boxes, origami, and Legos, they 
found that people do put more value on products they build, but only if they were built 
successfully. Staats et al. (2012) used Lego building sets to study the effects of adding 
people to project teams. They found that although there are advantages to doing so, 
managers often underestimated the disadvantages, including coordination difficulties. 
Lastly, Moreau and Engeset (2016) assigned subjects a well-defined task – a Lego kit 
with step-by-step instructions — as well as an ill-defined task – a bag of Lego bricks and 
pieces. They demonstrated that those with a well-defined task did not perform well on 
subsequent ill-defined tasks that required creativity. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) referred to a template as a working example of 
organizational routines that contained both critical and noncritical elements of the routine. 
These various elements “provide the details of how the work gets done, in what sequence 
and how various components and subroutines are interconnected” (Jensen and Szulanski 
2007, pg. 1717). Although each Lego kit contained a set of step-by-step instructions on 
how to build the product, no guidance was given in these instructions for the most 
efficient way to build the device by dividing the labor among team members. To create a 
template, we ran a series of pretests to establish a template for making our initial product: 
The Lego Sunset Speeder (Lego No. 31017). In addition to the researchers, these pretests 
involved several teams of undergraduate students from the university’s Supply Chain and 
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Operations Club who spent a full day creating an optimal workflow design based on both 
speed and precision. In developing the template, we considered how many people were 
included in the team, roles, and responsibilities per team member, material flow, and the 
physical arrangement of each team member. Once the template was finished (see 
electronic appendix for all templates used), we used the same schema to generate the 
template for the product assembled in the change condition: The Lego Red Go-Kart 
(Lego No. 31030). Although the Red Go Kart and the Sunset Speeder are similar in some 
ways (e.g., four wheels, steering wheel, front and back bumpers, etc.), they also differ 
(e.g., dimensions/orientation of parts, colors, number of unique parts, etc.). The Sunset 
Speeder requires 32 steps for assembly, and the Red Go Kart requires 34 steps. 
Assembling either of these products involves assembling the chassis as well as building 
several subassemblies that can later be attached to the chassis. This represents change 
because the Red Go-Kart, despite being similar to the Sunset Speeder, differed in 
numerous ways from it. For the Red Go-Kart, we used the template format for the Sunset 
Speeder: the same number of workers with the same responsibilities. However, we 
adjusted the template to fit the specific references to the construction steps required for 
building the Red Go Kart. 
Methods 
We recruited 228 undergraduate and graduate students from the subject pool of a large 
Midwestern business school and divided them into 57 four-person teams. Each team was 
assigned to build a Lego device as quickly as possible with no defects for five rounds. In 
each round, teams started with a bag filled with unsorted Lego pieces. There were 15 
teams in the “no template/change none” treatment; 14 teams in the “no template/change 
high” treatment; 14 teams in the “template high/change high” treatment, and 14 teams in 
the “template high/change none” treatment. As in past studies interested in learning 
effects (Epple et al. 1991; Darr et al. 1995, etc.), time acts as a proxy for cost in our 
experiment. Units judged defective had to be reassembled to conform to specifications 
before a round counted as complete; as such, quality defects only appear in our analysis 
as time delays. 
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Our unit of analysis in this study was the four-person production team. We varied 
two factors in the experiment: template use and change. We implemented these two 
factors in a full factorial between-subjects design. Therefore, teams were divided into 
four experimental conditions. Each team knew only of the experimental group it was in. 
In the template treatment, in addition to the instructions from Lego, the teams were given 
explicit directions regarding their production process, including details on material flow 
and division of labor. In the no template treatment, the teams got only the Lego 
instructions and were asked to organize themselves as they deemed best to accomplish 
the goal of building the device as quickly as possible with no defects. In the no change 
treatment, subjects assembled the Sunset Speeder, i.e., the device for which the template 
was designed. In the change treatment, the teams were asked to build the Red Go-Kart 
Lego device instead.  
All teams were given five minutes to discuss their approach before the start of the 
first round. They were also given three minutes between rounds to reassess their approach 
and adjust their process. Note that we allowed the teams within all conditions to make 
changes between rounds. In that sense, in the template treatment, the template only 
represents a starting point for all teams. This design choice was made to allow adaptation 
by all teams across all experimental conditions. Study 2 will explicitly examine template 
use without such adaptation. 
All participants were guaranteed $5 for completing the experiment, but teams had 
an incentive to deliver high performance because more money was possible based on a 
tiered compensation structure keyed to completion time. Each member of a four-person 
team received the same compensation as his or her teammates 
2.3.3 Analysis and Results 
During the planning phase before the first round, teams typically discussed unique 
strategies based on their experimental condition. When put into a template condition in 
which their positions and roles were initially fixed, they spent time discussing team 
responsibilities in detail as well as in creating a plan for how they could work together to 
best accomplish the goal.  For example, each template team had three builders (“Builder 
1,” “Builder 2,” and “Builder 3”) and a fourth member in charge of instructions and 
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material staging. The team member in charge of sorting materials would often ask, “how 
would you like for me to lay out the building materials?”  Or “how would you like your 
instructions to be shared throughout each round?” Although the teams had structure, it 
was still important for members to coordinate effectively. 
 Conversely, in the no template treatment in which no structure was provided, the 
teams typically spent time discovering who had skills that were best suited to the task at 
hand. “Who is good at building things?” or “does anybody have experience with putting 
building sets together?” were common questions. Once roles and responsibilities were 
determined, it was not uncommon for the no template teams to eventually create a 
process like the template teams in which there were multiple builders and one person in 
charge of instructions and material flow. But the process of arriving at an efficient 
operation took time, and there was plenty of experimentation along the way. 
 Before diving into a more detailed statistical analysis, it is useful to examine our 
data descriptively. Table 2.1 lists descriptive statistics across different time periods and 
experimental conditions. 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics across Template Conditions1 
Condition Period 1 2 3 4 5 
No Change 
No Template 
Mean	 14.75 10.39 8.39 6.46	 6.32	
Std. Dev.	 7.42 4.02 2.69	 1.35	 1.59	
No Change 
Template 
Mean	 14.52 9.49 7.17	 5.90	 5.06	
Std. Dev.	 3.03 2.98 1.33	 1.10 0.91	
Change 
No Template 
Mean	 15.92 9.67 7.27	 5.90	 5.24	
Std. Dev.	 6.00 2.88 1.97	 1.63	 1.63	
Change 
Template 
Mean 14.46 8.99 6.17	 5.57	 4.84	
Std. Dev.	 4.02 3.20 2.04	 1.82	 1.30	
Notes. Time is measured in minutes required to complete a product according to specifications. 
We make several observations. First, a learning curve pattern is clearly present in 
the mean durations across all conditions. Second, in the no change condition, both the 
                                                
1 One observation was removed before analysis. Specifically, one team in the template high condition 
refused to use the template in its first period, despite our explicit instructions to do so. The resulting time 
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means and standard deviations of observations are at all periods lower in the template 
condition than in the no template condition. This suggests that the template not only 
enabled teams to speed up on average, with time reductions between 9%-20% in rounds 
2-5, but also that the template served to standardize performance across teams. Note that 
a similar pattern occurs in the change conditions, although the difference in means across 
template conditions is much less pronounced, and standard deviations across teams only 
differ in the first round. 
To analyze our data more formally, we estimated a model that allowed us to 
differentiate learning curves across our experimental conditions. In accordance with H1A 
and H1B, we were especially interested in examining whether the parameters of the 
learning curve, i.e., the initial time to build the product (=a) and the learning rate (=b), 
changed across different experimental conditions. We applied the standard power law of 
learning in our model and used natural logs to linearize the model. Further, our model 
needed to account for the differences in learning curves across teams. Because we only 
observed teams for a few periods, we captured different learning curves across teams 
through random slopes and intercepts. Our model specification was as follows: 
    
In this specification, tp(i) refers to the duration of building the product for team i in 
period p. The constant ai and the slope bi are the parameters of the learning curve for 
team i, drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with standard deviations σa, σb and 
correlation coefficient ρab. This aspect of our model allowed us to efficiently represent 
the data structure of multiple observations being nested in the same team while explicitly 
recognizing that the parameters of the learning curve of a team are likely correlated with 
each other so that longer initial task durations likely imply steeper learning curves. The 
dummy variables Ci and Ti (for change and template) capture the experimental condition 
of team i and shift both the intercept and slope of the learning curve. Finally, deviations 
from the power law of learning are permitted through the random error term εp, which is 
distributed normally with period specific standard deviation σp. This aspect of our model 
allowed us to capture heteroscedasticity in the data caused by later periods possibly 
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exhibiting less noise than earlier periods. The model was estimated in Stata 14.2 using the 
“mixed” procedure. Results from the estimation are summarized in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Estimation Results from Random Effects Learning Curve Model2 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
Change 0.10 (0.11) 
Template 0.05 (0.11) 
Change×Template (H2A) -0.13 (0.16) 
ln(p) -0.51** (0.05) 
ln(p)×Change (H2) -0.17** (0.07) 
ln(p)×Template (H1) -0.14* (0.07) 
ln(p)×Change×Template (H2B) 0.13 (0.10) 
Constant 2.61** (0.08) 
σa 0.25** (0.04) 
σb 0.11** (0.04) 
ρab -0.71** (0.14) 
σ1 0.21** (0.04) 
σ2 0.21** (0.02) 
σ3 0.17** (0.02) 
σ4 0.15** (0.02) 
σ5 0.16** (0.02) 
N 284 [57]  
χ2 689.75**  
Notes. **p≤0.01; *p≤0.05; N refers to the number of observations, with the 
number of teams in brackets. 
Several findings emerged from our analysis. None of the direct treatment effects 
or their interaction terms were statistically significant. This indicates that the initial time 
to build the product was similar across all experimental conditions. This finding rejects 
both Hypotheses 1A and 2A, which predict differences in initial performance. However, 
the learning factor interacts with the treatments in our experiment, indicating that 
learning changed under different treatments. We also note that both variances in random 
                                                
2 Note that one observation from one team in the first round was removed from the analysis – this team, 
despite being in the template “high”’ condition ignored our requirement to follow the template strictly in 
the first round. Consequently, its performance was 16 minutes slower that the next slowest team in that 
condition. 
 
 29 
slopes and intercepts are significant, indicating that teams vary widely in the origin and 
shape of the learning curve; unsurprisingly, the correlation coefficient between these 
random slopes and intercepts is negative and significant, indicating that teams that 
initially took longer also had faster progress ratios.  Hypothesis 1B argues that template 
use will lead to higher learning rates, which is supported (b=-0.14, p ≤ 0.05). This is in 
line with our arguments related to the delayed impact of knowledge transfer through 
templates (see Ozkan-Seely et al. 2015). Using a template indeed speeds up learning, 
quite possibly by allowing individual team members to become experienced in their tasks 
faster. 
Hypothesis 2B argues that this performance improvement should not be visible 
and may even turn negative if product/process change is high. This hypothesis received 
only mixed support: Template use leads to essentially no difference in the learning 
factors if change is high (b=0.13-0.14=-0.01); as predicted, they did not seem to benefit 
from the template. However, the template did not hinder their learning as the experiment 
progressed either. Further, teams in the change condition generally had faster learning 
factors than no-change teams (b=-0.17, p≤0.01).  
H1C argues that template use within a low-change environment will lead to a 
reduction in performance variability between teams. To test this idea, we re-estimated our 
model in the no change condition, allowing the error variance to vary by template. See 
Table 2.3 for the results. The model estimates show that the residual variance in the 
template condition (σ=0.14 (s.e.=0.02)) was much lower than the residual variance in the 
no template condition (σ=0.20 (s.e.=0.02)). Compared to a model with equivalent 
residual variances across conditions, this model with different residual variances leads to 
an improvement in χ2 by 214.91-194.04=20.83, which is a significant improvement in 
model fit (p≤0.01). Therefore, H1C is supported. A similar analysis3 for the change 
condition revealed a small improvement in χ2 by 703.24-702.85=0.51, a difference that is 
not statistically significant. Performance across teams was thus better standardized with 
the template. 
 
                                                
3 Note that the random effects variance for the slope in the change condition was close to zero, and thus 
these random effects were removed from the estimation. 
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2.4. Study II - The Copy Exactly Approach 
As mentioned in the Introduction, Intel is known for its Copy Exactly method for 
knowledge transfer. Intel developed this method to minimize the time spent in a transfer 
to maintain product quality and production yields in line with expectations (McDonald, 
1998). Instead of the traditional approach in which matching the final product is the sole 
focus, Copy Exactly focuses on four levels of matching between source and recipient 
sites: physical inputs, process/equipment parameters, module outcomes, and final product 
specification. For Intel, this approach has yielded the desired results because new 
factories are brought online faster and deliver yields consistent with the source location. 
Also, if improvement ideas are generated during the installation of new lines, the ideas 
are tested and implemented across all lines (source location and recipient locations) so 
that improvements are made consistently in the network (McDonald, 1998). Terwiesch 
and Xu (2004) extended Intel’s Copy Exactly idea to describe a ramp-up strategy in 
which, after introduction of a process into a production facility, a firm prohibits any 
changes in the process until enough time has elapsed that the process can produce large 
market-ready quantities. 
Table 2.3: Results Using Different Residual Variances across Template Conditions 
 No Change Change 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
Template	 0.05	 (0.12)	 -0.07	 (0.10)	
ln(p)	 -0.51**	 (0.06)	 -0.69**	 (0.04)	
ln(p)×Template (H1)	 -0.14†	 (0.08)	 -0.02	 (0.05)	
Constant	 2.61**	 (0.09)	 2.71**	 (0.07)	
σa	 0.17**	 (0.04)	 0.22**	 (0.03)	
σb	 0.28**	 (0.05)	 -	 -	
ρab	 -0.85** (0.08)	 - -	
σTemplate	 0.14**	 (0.02)	 0.18**	 (0.02)	
σNo Template	 0.20**	 (0.02)	 0.17**	 (0.02)	
N	 145 (29)	  139(28)	  
χ2	 214.91**	  703.24**	  
Notes. **p≤0.01; *p≤0.05; †p≤0.10. N refers to the number of observations, with the number of teams in 
brackets. 
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In Study I, templates were only initially enforced, and teams could subsequently 
modify the template. This conceptualization of template use does not correspond to Copy 
Exactly because process parameters and module outcomes can change after the first 
round of the experiment. Using Copy Exactly instead, i.e., not allowing any process 
modifications as time progresses, corresponds to higher standardization. At the same time, 
it reduces adaptation and the sense of ownership with recipients. Thus, Study II examined 
whether the benefits of standardization inherent in Copy Exactly outweigh the potentially 
negative behavioral responses from recipients. 
2.4.1 Theory 
To explain what we may expect when using the Copy Exactly strategy, we draw upon the 
findings from organizational behavior on individual and team level motivation. Bernstein 
(2012) tested the implications of a transparent (accurate observability) organizational 
design on workers’ productivity and organizational performance in the setting of a large 
Chinese contract manufacturer of mobile phones. Transparency in this study can be 
thought of as a form of standardization (e.g., template use) in which the goal of the firm 
is to maintain operational control and the desired levels of productivity. The author 
concedes that transparency may improve a unit’s access to the expertise, experience, and 
stored knowledge of another unit — thereby increasing the quantity and quality of 
knowledge transfer. But it may also “counter-intuitively reduce their performance by 
inducing those being observed to conceal their activities through codes and other costly 
means” (Bernstein 2012, p. 181) to avoid trouble with management. Through 
experimentation within the contract manufacturer, they found that by creating “zones of 
privacy” for groups of workers, the firm significantly increased line performance by 
supporting productive deviance, localized experimentation, and continuous improvement. 
Within these zones of privacy, workers could use their own methods to build and pack 
mobile phones, versus the standardized managers’ methods. The workers also took the 
opportunity to switch roles among themselves so they could train for the future. In the 
same way, although template use has its merits — especially as it relates to operational 
control — we believe there is a point at which too much operational control adversely 
affects individual and team performance. Bernstein (2012) demonstrated that there is a 
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certain level of empowerment that should be extended to employees. Otherwise, their full 
capabilities will not be tapped, which could lead to reduced performance. 
Zhang and Bartol (2010), interested in understanding if/how psychological 
empowerment is linked to employee creativity, developed a theoretical model and then 
empirically demonstrated that psychological empowerment is positively linked to 
intrinsic motivation and employee creativity. Mathieu et al. (2006) sought to test a 
proposed link between team empowerment and both customer satisfaction and 
quantitative performance by gathering empirical data from customer service engineers at 
a major office equipment and technology organization. Through survey responses, they 
found that team empowerment led to improved team processes and ultimately to 
improved customer satisfaction and quantitative performance. They argued that “to the 
extent team members are empowered, they will be liberated to better execute transition 
and action processes as they see fit…coordinate their own actions and otherwise align 
their collective efforts with work demands to meet their performance goals” (p. 101). 
These examples show that although some structure is needed to ensure workers are 
aligned with company goals, too much structure without worker input can have adverse 
behavioral consequences. 
We can also look at the literature on organizational creativity to find theory in 
favor of deviating from the status quo. Shalley and Gilson (2016) address the idea of 
balancing creativity and standardization and argue that creativity is essential for societal 
and economic growth.  Further, they state that with the creativity process “it is important 
to first engage in processes that challenge the status quo, move away from established 
ways of doing things and seek out new approaches to how work is performed”. This 
process involves “searching broadly for diverse information, seeking out new approaches, 
linking ideas from multiple sources, generating solutions and elaborating on the ideas 
developed” (pg. 5). 
Within our experiment, making the template rigid reduced autonomy for workers, 
thereby making the task a simple execution of a process design that the workers have no 
ownership in. Without ownership, the task is very transactional, reducing the workers’ 
sense of empowerment, motivation and creativity. Without empowerment, intrinsic 
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motivation and the ability to create, the workers may attribute poor performance more to 
the system (i.e., the process handed to them) than to themselves, reducing their effort as 
well as their motivation to improve further. With that in mind, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 3A: The Copy Exactly approach will lead to lower initial 
performance (learning) versus Template Use with the ability to search and adapt. 
HYPOTHESIS 3B:  The Copy Exactly approach will lead to a slower learning rate 
over time versus Template Use with the ability to search and adapt. 
 
2.4.2 Experimental Design 
The 30 teams in Study II used the same template for the Sunset Speeder and Red Go Kart 
devices as the teams in Study I.  Unlike Study I, none of the Study II teams could deviate 
from the template between rounds. The only adaptation they could make was that team 
members could switch roles. Other than the strict adherence to the template, Study II was 
conducted in the same way as Study I. Our theory from the previous section applies to 
both the Change and the No Change conditions, since the only necessity for the effects 
underlying H3 is the existence of the template, independent of the product for which the 
template was designed. For completeness, we ran our experiment in Study II under both 
Change and No Change conditions, expecting a similar effect of Copy Exactly under both 
conditions. 
Data from Study II was merged for analysis with the template condition data from 
Study I. We recruited 120 undergraduate and graduate students from the subject pool of a 
large Midwestern business school and divided them into 30 four-person teams. Each team 
was assigned to build a Lego device as quickly as possible with no defects, for five 
rounds. There were 15 teams in the copy exactly/no change experimental condition and 
15 teams in the copy exactly/change condition. 
2.4.3 Analysis and Results 
Table 2.4 lists descriptive statistics of our data across different time periods and 
experimental conditions. We merged the template data from Study I with the copy 
exactly data in Study II so that we could examine differences between the two approaches 
(template use with search, Study I vs. template use without search, Study II). The no-
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copy exactly teams outperformed the copy exactly teams in every round by a significant 
margin. 
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics across Template Conditions4 
 Period 1 2 3 4 5 
No Change 
No Copy Exactly 
Mean	 14.52 9.49 7.17	 5.90	 5.06	
Std. Dev.	 3.03 2.98 1.33	 1.10	 0.91	
No Change 
Copy Exactly 
Mean	 18.74	 11.79	 9.19	 7.13	 7.23	
Std. Dev.	 4.74	 4.20	 4.39	 1.42	 2.97	
Change 
No Copy Exactly 
Mean	 14.46 8.74 5.97	 5.44	 4.63	
Std. Dev.	 4.02 3.18 1.97	 1.83	 1.08	
Change 
Copy Exactly 
Mean	 18.33	 9.55	 7.26	 6.54	 5.24	
Std. Dev.	 3.41	 2.60	 2.40	 2.22	 1.01	
 
To proceed with our analysis, we estimated an empirical model like the one 
estimated in Study I. We used change and copy exactly, as well as their interaction, as 
independent variables in the analysis. The model was estimated in Stata 14.2 using the 
“mixed” procedure. Results from the estimation are summarized in Table 2.5 below. 
Several findings emerged from our analysis. First, the direct treatment effect of Copy 
Exactly is statistically significant and positive, which means that the initial time to build 
the product was longer under Copy Exactly than under the non-copy exactly treatment in 
the No Change condition. This finding supports Hypothesis 3A, which predicts an initial 
performance deficit when employing the copy exactly approach. Second, the learning 
factor does not interact with the treatments in our experiment, which indicates that the 
learning rates between Copy Exactly and Non-Copy Exactly are the same.5 This finding 
rejects Hypothesis 3B, which predicted a slower learning rate for the Copy Exactly 
approach. However, because the Copy Exactly approach drives a much slower startup 
versus the non-copy exactly, the fact that their learning rates are the same is somewhat 
                                                
4 Note that as in Study I, the performance in the first round from one team has been removed from the 
analysis. 
 
5 Note that the ln(p)×CopyExact interaction in Table 6 measures an effect that is different from the 
ln(p)×Template interaction in Table 2. Under No Change, the latter effect measures the difference in 
learning rates between Template and No Template conditions, while the former measures the difference 
between Templates under Copy Exact and Non-Copy Exact. 
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moot because a significant performance gap remains between both approaches 
throughout the experiment. This gap delivers a roughly 19% slower processing time 
across the entire experiment.  To put that in perspective, over a standard eight-hour shift, 
non-Copy Exactly teams can build the same number of products in 6.5 hours that it takes 
the Copy Exactly teams 8 hours to produce.  
As expected, Copy Exactly seems to influence template use similarly under 
Change and No-Change conditions, since the direct effect, as well as all interactions with 
Change are non-significant. In other words, Copy Exactly leads to an adverse 
motivational response that manifests itself in increased processing times within teams 
compared to Non-Copy Exactly, independent of whether the Template was developed for 
the product in question, or for a related similar product. 
  
 36 
Table 2.5: Estimation Results from Model of Random Effects Learning 
 Curve  
Variable	 Coefficient	 Std. Error	
Change	 -0.04	 (0.09)	
CopyExact	 0.21**	 (0.09)	
Change×CopyExact	 0.02	 (0.12)	
ln(p)	 -0.65**	 (0.04)	
ln(p)×Change	 -0.05	 (0.05)	
ln(p)×CopyExact	 0.01	 (0.05)	
ln(p)×Change×CopyExact	 -0.07	 (0.07)	
Constant	 2.66**	 (0.07)	
σa	 0.18**	 (0.03)	
σb	 0.05	 (0.07)	
ρab	 0.05	 (0.94)	
σ1	 0.17**	 (0.04)	
σ2	 0.21**	 (0.02)	
σ3	 0.21**	 (0.02)	
σ4	 0.14**	 (0.02)	
σ5	 0.15**	 (0.02)	
N	 285 [57]	  
χ2	 1457.82**	  
Notes. **p≤0.01; *p≤0.05; N refers to the number of observations, with the 
number of teams in brackets.  Numbers are expressed in natural log form. 
 
2.5. Discussion 
The questions guiding our research in this chapter are “does template use lead to higher 
performance than local adaptation when transferring production process knowledge?” 
and “does rigidly enforcing a template result in adverse behavioral consequences at the 
recipient site?” Although a move is complex and involves a variety of decisions, at the 
heart of the move is an exercise in knowledge transfer and the choice of whether to use a 
template exclusively (e.g., Intel’s Copy Exactly) or to adapt the template locally to fit the 
characteristics of the recipient site. Until now, this debate was waged primarily in the 
strategy literature (Winter and Szulanski 2001, Jensen and Szulanski 2007, Szulanski and 
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Jensen 2008, Winter et al. 2012) with the studies focused on firm or store unit 
performance in a low change, service context. In our research, we tested the merits of 
template use under low and high change at the team level within a manufacturing context. 
We also sought to empirically test the merits of Intel’s Copy Exactly technology transfer 
strategy, which had not been done outside of Intel. Study I shows that when moving 
production processes between similar settings, using a template to transfer process 
knowledge may not lead to an initial difference in performance, but does lead to better 
performance (faster learning) over time than attempting to create a new process in the 
recipient location. The lack of an initial difference in performance is consistent with 
Ozkan-Seely et al. (2015, pg. 177) who argue that while benefits from knowledge 
development are instantaneous, benefits from knowledge transfer are lagged “because of 
the difficulties in articulating and documenting knowledge as well as the challenges 
regarding its interpretation and application.” 
In Study II, we find that there are limits to the benefits of template use. If the 
template is rigidly enforced, without the ability for the recipient teams to search for ways 
to adapt it, performance can suffer. Teams in the Copy Exactly conditions have similar 
learning rates, albeit higher learning curve intercepts, than teams in the Non-Copy 
Exactly conditions. This leads to a performance gap of approximately 19% in processing 
times across all five periods in the experiment. 
While overall processing times under Copy-Exactly were slower than under Non-
Copy-Exactly, it was surprising to us that learning rates for Copy Exactly and Non-Copy 
Exactly teams were similar. A possible explanation for this observation could be that the 
template reduces the need for process learning - division of tasks, product flow, etc. - 
within the recipient teams by transferring an optimized layout and workflow from the 
source team. Learning in the template teams is thus mostly individual learning – team 
members becoming more experienced at their allocated tasks. Such learning may happen 
more subconsciously, and be less dependent on effort and motivation than process 
learning. As a result, learning for both conditions where templates are employed happens 
similarly. 
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 If we take the results from Study I and II together, when moving production 
between manufacturing environments, managers should ensure that a template is utilized 
and that the intended recipients of the template have the flexibility to adapt it and 
participate in the design of their work. Of course, in certain industries, regulations may 
limit the ability to deviate from a template. Also, process complexity could be a factor 
that influences whether a firm should strictly rely on a template. A process may be so 
complex that the successful execution of it at the recipient site is causally ambiguous 
(Szulanski 1996). In that case, the firm may choose to avoid risk by keeping the process 
the same as it was in the source location. We hope that future research examines process 
complexity here as a possible moderator. 
Although our study makes an important contribution to the field’s understanding 
of process moves, template use, and knowledge transfer, it has limitations. The laboratory 
approach we use emphasizes internal over external validity (Siemsen 2011). Thus, further 
testing our insights in the field would be valuable. Further, creating a way to reliably 
measure quality as a dependent variable would be a worthwhile contribution. In addition, 
we manipulated change only through a product change; additional forms of change, such 
as materials or labor, would be useful to study as well.  
Our research provides further evidence that using templates is an important aspect 
of process moves; the benefit of a template is not that initial performance increases, but 
rather that learning happens at a much faster rate, reducing the time to bring the process 
to productive levels. The template serves as a key input (Gladstein, 1984; Guzzo and 
Dickson, 1996, Mathieu et al. 2000) to creating a shared mental model for the team to use 
while working together (Mathieu 2000). These models help facilitate both team related 
and task related benefits which are vital to team success. 
Building on the results of chapter 2 and based on discussions with a multinational 
plastics molder, chapter 3 investigates a factor that may impede or enhance a firm’s 
ability to transfer process knowledge during a production move: Functional Diversity.   
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Chapter 3: 
 
Functional Diversity and its Impact on 
Knowledge Transfer Effectiveness 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Firms are often pressured by their customers or competitors to adapt and move their 
production processes within and between countries. Such a shift in process location is 
often not a trivial exercise, requiring the impacted parties to head down a new learning 
curve. A firm’s goal is to minimize this disruption by carefully managing the knowledge 
associated with the production process. 
While knowledge creation (Nonaka, 1994) and knowledge retention (Argote et al. 
1990) are both key in ensuring production move success, knowledge transfer (Argote, 
2013) is at the heart of a production process move. The risk of failing to transfer 
knowledge during a move is arguably high. Therefore firms spend considerable time and 
effort to prepare for and ensure the successful knowledge transfer during a move.  
Typical practices include creating standard operating procedures (SOPs), service scripts, 
and even special methodologies like the “Copy Exactly” approach from Intel (McDonald 
1998) to ensure that knowledge transfer is effective. In this study, we investigate the role 
of functional diversity in enhancing/eroding knowledge transfer effectiveness when 
using templates. 
 Executing work in teams is a key element of today’s successful, innovative firms 
(Ichniowski, Shaw 1999). Be it a new product launch, a cost-savings initiative or a 
production process move, organizations tend to pool the collective expertise, perspective 
and effort of various people throughout the organization to accomplish tasks. With this 
reliance on teams, there has been much debate within the academic literature on how to 
structure them (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992). When considering a production move, 
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much of the work that determines the success or failure of the move involves knowledge 
transfer between a source and a recipient team. Knowledge transfer means learning 
indirectly from the experience of others, and often occurs across a boundary, e.g. 
organizational units, groups or geographies (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011). Such 
boundaries can imply barriers to knowledge transfer, which in turn reduce the 
effectiveness with which a transfer can happen. As seen in Kent and Siemsen (2017), 
even when a proven template is used in the transfer, the benefit of the knowledge to the 
recipient is lagged. If there are additional factors that extend this lag, a firm is at a 
heightened risk of missed shipments, lost revenue and potential damage to supply chain 
relationships. 
Knowledge transfer in a production process move is occurring across plant 
boundaries. We know from past studies that characteristics of the source and recipient 
boundary units, such as their absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), similarity 
(Darr and Kurtzberg, 2000) and relationship quality (Szulanski 1996, Zollo and Reur 
2010) matter. A factor that has not been analyzed in this context is the between team 
functional diversity, which is the extent to which education, experience and expertise 
(Jehn et al., 1999) of team members across different teams differ. Typically, research 
studies “within team” functional diversity, but when it comes to process moves, where 
there is a source location sending a production process to a recipient location, there is 
also “between team” functional diversity to consider.  We therefore ask the following 
research question: Does functional diversity impact the effectiveness of a proven 
template when transferring production process knowledge? 
To investigate this question, we take a behavioral approach. Even though 
production process moves are complex and multidimensional, at the core of a move is an 
exercise in effective knowledge transfer and task understanding; both of these topics lend 
themselves to behavioral research. In our behavioral experiments, teams repeatedly build 
a device using a proven template that was encoded by other participants from similar or 
dissimilar functional backgrounds to assess if between-team functional diversity impacts 
performance. Before we discuss our behavioral experiments, we illustrate the role of 
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functional diversity during a process move by looking at the example of Far East 
Molding (FEM)6 and a move the company made in the early 2000s.  
FEM is a precision plastic molding company with manufacturing operations in 
China and Thailand.  The company was founded several decades ago, and has grown by 
working in the consumer electronics, household goods, hard disk drives, automotive and 
healthcare industries. Due to the nature of their products, they are typically a second tier 
supplier. However, since FEM is highly skilled, they are usually given responsibility for 
key subcomponents, like the plastic housing and filtration systems for hard disk drives. 
The company’s yearly revenue is approximately $50-$100 million. 
In the early 2000s, their hard disk drive (HDD) customers asked FEM to move the 
component making process from China to Thailand to be closer to finished goods 
production. FEM agreed and began to establish a team in the source location (China) as 
well as a recipient team in Thailand. Since FEM had never operated in Thailand, team 
composition became an early and important topic to address. FEM organized production 
process specialists at their China facility to serve as the “source” team transferring 
process knowledge to the Thai facility. This group was primarily made of Engineering 
and Production specialists who had been working on the production process for several 
years. Since the recipient facility was brand new, FEM thought it best to establish a 
recipient team comprised of various functions that could play a role on the project from a 
business and technical point of view, including: Legal, Finance, HR, Government 
Relations, Sourcing, Engineering.  For over a month, the transfer dyad (source and 
recipient teams) had difficulty executing the project schedule, driven in large part by the 
divergent interests that each team represented. The source team grew frustrated by the 
lack of focus among the recipient team, as meetings often ranged a variety of non-
technical topics such as supply chain development in Thailand, material sourcing, budget 
concerns, etc. While these topics were important, they did not pertain directly to the 
expertise and background of the source team members. This lack of focus was due in 
large part to not having recipient team members who could effectively communicate with 
the source members on the technical matters of the project. Ultimately, FEM’s 
                                                
6 We use the name “Far East Molding (FEM)” to conceal the actual identity of this company. 
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management decided to take two actions: one was to fully invest in technical personnel at 
the recipient site who could communicate with the source team and receive their 
knowledge of the HDD component making process. Second, FEM divided the transfer 
dyad into two: one dyad focused on the technical needs of the process move and the other 
dyad focused on the business needs of the move. These changes proved effective and 
allowed FEM to meet their 12 month transition timeline, as the technical source team was 
finally able to focus on the technical needs of the move, sharing key details of the process 
and training the recipient team along the way. FEM discovered that having functional 
diversity between teams was inefficient, demotivating and unproductive. 
 The remainder of the paper is presented in the following manner: In section 2 we 
examine relevant literature, identifying research gaps that we plan to address. Section 3 
develops the hypotheses that are grounded in theory developed from relevant literature.  
Section 4 presents the empirical setting and data, and in section 5 we discuss our 
analytical results.  Lastly, in section 6 we highlight the strategic and operational 
implications of this study, its limitations and explore future research directions. 
 
3.2. Relevant Literature 
Functional Diversity 
The topic of functional diversity has been discussed among management/strategy 
scholars for over 20 years. There are several noteworthy studies for our particular context. 
A more complete literature review is given by Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2002). 
 In a seminal study, Ancona and Caldwell (1992) collected data from 409 people 
across 45 new product development teams within five high technology companies. A key 
finding in their research is that functional diversity drove increased communication 
within and outside the team, leading to a higher team innovation rating when judged by 
management. Despite this higher innovation rating, the overall effect of functional 
diversity on team performance was negative. The authors argue that while diversity may 
bring more creativity to the product development process, it impedes implementation of a 
newly developed product. This impediment may be caused by the fact that the various 
functions with a team are like different “‘thought worlds’ each focusing on different 
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aspects of technology-market knowledge, and making different sense of the total” 
(Dougherty, 1992). 
 Jehn et al. (1999) studies three types of team diversity: social category, value and 
informational diversity. Informational diversity can be thought of as differences in 
knowledge bases that various members bring to the group. These differences have their 
roots in the variety of education, experience and expertise between team members, i.e. a 
concept that is close to functional diversity. The authors hypothesize that while 
informational diversity increases both task (what to do) and process (how to do) conflict, 
it also would increase performance (work team productivity). Using data collected via 
survey of 485 employees within a top household goods moving company, they found that 
informational diversity led to increased levels of conflict and it also led to increased 
performance, especially when tasks were complex. “Research has demonstrated that 
differences in educational background lead to an increase in task-related debates in work 
teams” (Jehn et al., 1997).  
 Instead of functional diversity, Van Der Vegt and Bunderson (2005) examined 
“expertise diversity” and its impact on multidisciplinary team learning and performance. 
They recruited 57 teams within one oil and gas company. As part of their study’s 
motivation, the authors share two conflicting views on the role of expertise diversity by 
the 19th century philosopher John Stuart Mill, showing why this is not a simple and linear 
subject to study.  Mill states that “It is hardly possible to overrate the value…of placing 
human beings in contact with persons dissimilar to themselves...such communication has 
always been, and is particularly in the present age, one of the primary sources of progress” 
(Mill, 1848). However, Mill also states 20 years later that “intimate society between 
people radically dissimilar to one another is an idle dream. Unlikeness may attract, but it 
is likeness which retains” (Mill, 1869). 
Via surveys, the authors analyze how performance (supervisor ratings) of these 
teams would be impacted by collective team identification, which is the extent to which 
members feel emotionally attached to their team, and team learning behaviors, which are 
“activities by which team members seek to acquire, share, refine or combine task-relevant 
knowledge through interaction with one another” (Van Der Vegt and Bunderson 2005). 
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They found that expertise diversity did not affect performance in a linear fashion. Its 
impact on performance was moderated by collective team identification and partially 
mediated by team learning behaviors. They also find that independent of collective team 
identification, expertise diversity was most strongly associated with performance at 
moderate levels of diversity. These findings appear to be consistent with Sampson (2007, 
see below) who also found that moderate levels of diversity are most suitable. While this 
study is informative, the subjective manner in which it measures performance (supervisor 
ratings) could leave the results open to speculation. In our study, we choose to take an 
objective approach to performance (completion time i.e. cost) and have clearly defined 
roles for each team member within our experiment to alleviate concerns regarding team 
performance. 
 Sampson (2007) is one of the few papers in this stream of research that does not 
focus on “within team” diversity but instead looks at “between team” diversity. 
Specifically, the author analyzes the impact of partner technological diversity on firm 
innovative performance after an alliance. The concept of technological diversity is similar 
to functional diversity except that in the Sampson study, technological background of the 
firm is considered instead of individual or team functional specialization. The paper 
discusses how “R&D collaborations present unique coordination challenges, since some 
sharing or transfer of knowledge over firm boundaries is usually required. Successful 
knowledge transfer is not assured, particularly when knowledge is tacit or complex” (pg. 
364). Knowledge transfer in this context is made even more complicated when 
considering a firm’s desire to avoid unintended spillover effects when exchanging 
information with their alliance partner. The author provides arguments that technological 
diversity should be either low or high, and then hypothesizes that a moderate level of 
technological diversity will lead to increased firm innovation, measured by post alliance 
patents. Using data from 463 R&D alliances involving 487 firms in the 
telecommunications equipment industry, the study finds that increasing technological 
diversity improves firm innovative performance. However, beyond a certain point, the 
innovative performance declines as technological diversity increases further. Therefore, 
their hypothesis is supported.  
 45 
This study offers a nuanced perspective for how diversity between two teams can 
impact innovation performance. However, there are a couple of key differences between 
Sampson (2007) and our study.  First, while Sampson (2007) studied two separate firms 
forming an alliance, we are looking at two teams within the same firm. There is no 
concern of spillover effects stemming from sharing too much information in our context. 
Also, while Sampson (2007) solely focused on innovation, our study examines execution 
at the recipient site as well. This is an important distinction because within this literature 
stream, there is substantial consensus that functional diversity leads to improved idea 
generation. But what is at debate is how does this same diversity work together to turn 
those ideas into reality that can lead to top and bottom line results. Our study seeks to 
address this question by gathering data generated by teams executing the ideas of teams 
with similar and dissimilar functional backgrounds. 
 Boone and Hendricks (2009) focus on the functional background of top 
management teams (TMTs) and how the variety of knowledge and cognitions created by 
functional diversity impacts decision quality and ultimately firm performance. They 
argue that functional diversity can only be unleashed at the TMT level when there is 
strong collaboration among team members, accurate information exchange and 
decentralized decision making. With data from 33 European information technology 
firms, they find that functional background is positively related to firm performance 
when there is accurate information exchange, truly collaborative behavior between team 
members, and decentralized decision making. This study is informative because as we 
think of how using a proven template may be impacted by functional diversity, Boone 
and Hendricks (2009) would argue that if the information in the proven template is 
communicated accurately by the source team function, and the recipient team members 
work well together and share decision making responsibility, the between team functional 
diversity should lead to increased learning and overall performance. 
 In summary, the potential benefits of functional diversity have been discussed for 
over 20 years within the management/strategy literature. But very little research has 
examined how functional diversity impacts knowledge transfer, or how it impacts 
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manufacturing performance. Also, past studies primarily investigate within team 
functional diversity, while our study focuses on between team functional diversity.  
 
3.3. Theory 
As mentioned previously, Ancona and Caldwell (1992) empirically tested the merits of 
functional diversity and found that while the presence of functional diversity improve 
communication within and outside of the projects teams, functional diversity does not 
have a positive relationship with team performance or innovation. They argue that having 
functional diversity “impedes implementation because there is less capability for 
teamwork than there is for homogenous teams.”   
 In Dougherty (1992), the author is interested in uncovering potential barriers to 
successful product innovation. The authors talks about how “the styles in which people 
organize their thinking and action about innovation-their ‘interpretive schemes’-are major 
barriers to linking and collaboration” (p. 179). One such barrier is that each department 
(or function) is like a different “thought world”, each focusing on different aspects of 
available knowledge, and making a different sense of the knowledge. Further, the 
organizational routines within each department exacerbate, rather than coordinate, these 
thought worlds, which constricts potential learning. The author contends that two aspects 
of each thought world are relevant to product innovation: its “fund of knowledge” or 
what they know, and its “systems of meaning” or how they know. “Thought worlds with 
different funds of knowledge cannot easily share ideas, and may view one another’s 
central issues as esoteric, or meaningless. A thought world also evolves an internally 
shared system of meaning which provides a ‘readiness for directed perception’ based on 
common procedures, judgments and methods, The systems of meaning produce an 
‘intrinsic harmony’ for the thought world, so ideas that do not fit may be reconfigured or 
rejected outright.” (Dougherty, 1992, pg. 182).    
 During a production process move, usually current business is being transferred 
from one location to another, and it is vital that it is done so without delay. Since a move 
involves a recipient team receiving both explicit and tacit knowledge from a source 
location, if they are derived from different thought worlds, they may selectively pick and 
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choose information that lines up with their previous understanding, ignoring information 
that may be equally important to delivering the necessary performance. The inclusion of 
different thought worlds between the source and recipient teams may also limit the 
opportunity for collective learning, as each group may think they know all there is to 
know. This lack of coordination during a move could lead to a reduction in initial 
learning, which is the speed in which the recipient team ramps up to the expected level of 
performance. 
Consistent with rationale in Jehn et al. (1999), we would also expect conflict to 
increase when knowledge is transferred between functionally diverse teams because 
bringing together teams with different educational backgrounds could lead to an increase 
in task-related debates (Jehn, 1999; Stasser, 1992). With these perspectives in mind, we 
present the following hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Between team functional diversity leads to reduced 
performance when transferring production process knowledge. 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Between team functional diversity leads to increased levels 
of task and process conflict when transferring production process 
knowledge. 
3.4. Empirical Setting & Methods 
 
Operationalizing a Production Process and Functional Diversity 
 
In our experiment, we used Lego building sets to simulate a production process. There is 
an extensive history of Lego building sets being used in rigorous academic research, not 
to mention being used within corporate and university settings to examine real world 
phenomena. In Ariely et al. (2008), the authors analyzed the role of productivity by 
having male undergraduate subjects build a 40-piece Bionicle Lego model over and over 
with a declining wage for each subsequent model built. Subjects were in either the 
“meaningful” condition, in which they would be able to see the models they finished over 
the course of the entire experiment.  Otherwise, they were in the “Sisyphus” condition in 
which each finished Lego model was disassembled after completion. The researchers 
found that the subjects in the meaningful category built significantly more Lego Bionicles 
than those in the Sisyphus condition. Staats et al. (2012) use Lego building sets to study 
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the effects of adding people to project teams and find that while there are advantages of 
doing so, managers often underestimate the disadvantages, including coordination 
difficulties.  They term this the “team scaling fallacy” and introduce reasons why this 
occurs.  Moreau and Engeset (2016) assigned subjects a well-defined task – A Lego kit 
with step-by-step instructions – as well as a ill defined task – a bag of Lego bricks and 
pieces.  They demonstrated that those who began with a well-defined task did not 
perform well on subsequent ill-defined tasks that required creativity. Lastly, in Kent and 
Siemsen (2017), the authors examine the role of template use when transferring 
production process knowledge.  A template is defined as a working example of 
organizational routines that contain both critical and noncritical elements of the routine 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Using Lego building sets and 87 teams of 4 people, the 
authors demonstrate that using a template leads to better performance than not using one. 
A template also leads to reduced performance variability between teams.  
Functional diversity is operationalized as follows: First we recruited multiple 4-
person teams of either Engineering or Business students to serve as our source teams. 
Each of these source teams was asked to encode the template given to them. By encode, 
we mean that the teams were verbally instructed to use a particular process to build the 
device, they then made the device multiple times using this process, and were then asked 
to codify what they experienced into a written template so it could be used by future 
recipient teams. This process ensured that all source teams were encoding the same 
process, such that differences between templates across source teams were due to the 
encoding process, and not due to fundamentally different processes being encoded. Then, 
a written template was chosen7 that best represents the process it was derived from. Once 
the two templates (one for Engineering, one for Business) were chosen, 120 students with 
a Business background and 120 students with an Engineering background were recruited 
from a large Midwestern university and randomly divided into teams of 4 people within 
each function, all serving as the “recipient” teams for the process knowledge being 
transferred. 
                                                
7 Supply Chain Ph.D. students were recruited to choose which template would represent the Engineering 
and Business “source” teams.  They made their choice based on clarity of the template as well as accuracy 
vs. the original process. 
 49 
 
Methods 
We divided the 240 subjects into 60 teams of 4. Each team was asked to build a Lego 
device (Sunset Speeder – 31017) as quickly as possible with no defects, for five rounds. 
As in past studies interested in learning effects (Epple et al. 1991; Darr et al. 1995, etc.), 
time acts as a proxy for cost in our experiment.  Units judged to be defective had to be 
reassembled to conform to specifications before a round counted as complete; as such, 
quality defects only appear as time delays in our analysis. 
 Our unit of analysis is the four-person production team. We varied two factors in 
the experiment: Template Origin and Template Destination. We implemented both 
factors in a full factorial between-subjects design, so we divided the teams into four 
experimental conditions (2 x 2). Each team only knew of the experiment group it was in.  
When the template origin and destination were the same function (e.g. Business to 
Business), functional diversity could be considered “low”. Conversely, when the template 
origin and destination were different (e.g. Engineering to Business), functional diversity 
could be considered “high”. To make the origin of the template salient to the recipient 
teams, they were informed where the template came from before starting the experiment. 
All teams were given five minutes to discuss their approach before the start of the 
first round. They were also given three minutes between rounds to reassess their approach 
and make adjustments to their process, if necessary. Note that we allowed the teams 
within all conditions to make changes between rounds. We had each team self-report 
their changes and we tracked them to determine the level of task and process conflict 
within the experiment (see section 3.4.2 for more details). All participants were 
guaranteed $5 for completing the experiment, but teams had an incentive to speed up 
their production since their total compensation was linked to their team’s completion time 
(the Appendix contains a complete set of instructions for experiments). 
 Jehn et al. 1999 states that when teams disagree on “what to do” within a task 
assignment, that is task conflict. When they disagree on “how to do it” within a task 
assignment, that is process conflict. We use self-reported changes8 as a proxy for conflict 
                                                
8 Self-reported changes are the unique ideas generated between each round.  These ideas were self reported 
by each participating team and independently validated by two PhD. candidates. 
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because it shows teams not content with doing what has been given to them, so they are 
searching for an optimized solution. Since we are interested in understanding if 
functional diversity causes task and process conflict, we use the number of changes made 
to the process each round as a proxy for task and process conflict. We view the number of 
changes as a good proxy for conflict because this measure shows the team’s 
dissatisfaction with the template they have been given. These process changes were self-
reported by each team when they were given time between rounds to discuss their process 
and how it could be improved. 
  
3.4.2 Analysis and Results 
Before diving into a more detailed statistical analysis, it is useful to examine our data 
descriptively. Table 3.1 lists descriptive statistics across different time periods and 
experimental conditions. We make several observations. First, a learning curve pattern is 
clearly visible in the mean durations across both Functionally Diverse and non 
Functionally Diverse conditions. Second, in the Business to Engineering condition, we 
see a major difference (slower completions) across all rounds vs. the other three 
conditions. The Business recipient teams’ performance also slows when they receive an 
Engineering source template, but this effect appears much less pronounced than in the 
Business to Engineering case. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics across Conditions 
Condition	 Period	 1 2 3 4 5 
       
Business to 
Engineering  Mean	 17.86 13.44 9.44 7.88 7.08 
(FDBE) Std. Dev.	 2.43 2.44 2.15 1.83 1.42 
       
Business to     
Business Mean	 12.48 8.79 7.79 6.77 6.20 
(Non-FDBB) Std. Dev.	 1.63 1.28 1.69 1.19 1.12 
       
Engineering to 
Business Mean	 13.46 8.72 7.53 7.16 6.59 
(FDEB) Std. Dev.	 1.19 1.06 0.69 0.56 0.52 
       
Engineering to 
Engineering Mean	 12.89 8.18 7.16 6.49 6.05 
(Non-FDEE) Std. Dev.	 1.28 0.84 0.99 0.71 0.57 
Notes.  Time is measured in minutes required to complete a product according to specifications. 
To analyze our data more formally, we estimated a model that allowed us to 
differentiate learning curves across our experimental conditions. In accordance with H1A 
and H1B, we were especially interested in examining whether the parameters of the 
learning curve, i.e., the initial time to build the product (=a) and the learning rate (=b), 
changed across different experimental conditions. We used the standard power law of 
learning in our model and used natural logs to linearize the model. Further, our model 
needed to account for the differences in learning curves across teams. Because we only 
observed teams for a few periods, we captured different learning curves across teams 
through random slopes and intercepts. Our model specification was as follows: 
  
 
In this specification, tp(i) refers to the duration of building the product for team i in 
period p. The constant ai and the slope bi are the parameters of the learning curve for 
team i, drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with standard deviations σa, σb and 
correlation coefficient ρab. This aspect of our model allowed us to efficiently represent 
ln t p(i )( ) = ln ai( )−bi ln p( )
+a1FDi + a2TRi + a3FDi ×TRi
+a4 ln p( )× FDi + a5 ln p( )×TRi + a6 ln p( )× FDi ×TR+ε p
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the data structure of multiple observations being nested in the same team while explicitly 
recognizing that the parameters of the learning curve of a team are likely correlated with 
each other so that longer initial task durations likely imply steeper learning curves. The 
dummy variables FDi and TRi (for Functional Diversity and Template Recipient) capture 
the experimental condition of team i and shift both the intercept and slope of the learning 
curve. When both FD and TR are turned on, that means the template originates from the 
Business teams and the Engineering teams are the recipients.  Finally, deviations from the 
power law of learning are permitted through the random error term εp, which is 
distributed normally with time period specific standard deviation σp. This aspect of our 
model allowed us to capture heteroscedasticity in the data caused by later periods 
possibly exhibiting less noise than earlier periods. The model was estimated in Stata 14.2 
using the “mixed” procedure. Results from the estimation are summarized in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Estimation Results from Random Effects Learning Curve Model 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
Func Div (Eng. to Bus.) 0.05 (0.04) 
Temp. Recipient (Eng. to Eng.) 0.01 (0.04) 
Func Div x Temp. Recipient (Bus. to Eng.) 0.34** (0.06) 
ln(p) -0.44** (0.02) 
ln(p)xFunc Div (Eng. to Bus.) -0.01 (0.03) 
ln(p)xTemp. Recipient (Eng. to Eng.) -0.03 (0.03) 
ln(p)xFunc. Div. x Temp. Recipient (Bus. to Eng.) -0.13** (0.05) 
Constant 2.50** (0.03) 
σa 0.06** (0.02) 
σb 0.04** (0.01) 
ρab 0.99** (0.00) 
σ1 0.11** (0.01) 
σ2 0.14** (0.14) 
σ3 0.14** (0.01) 
σ4 0.10** (0.01) 
σ5 0.11** (0.01) 
N 300 [60]  
χ2 1744.36**  
Notes. **p≤0.01; *p≤0.05; N refers to the number of observations, with the number of teams in brackets. 
 From these results, several findings emerge. First, the direct treatment effect of 
functional diversity when the recipient is Engineering is significant and positive. This 
means that the initial time to build the product was longer when the Engineering teams 
received a template from the Business source. This provides mixed support for 
Hypothesis 1, because contrary to the results above, when Business students received 
knowledge from Engineering students, they performed in line with the teams of Business 
students that received the template from Business students. Within the FDBE experiments, 
there was a clear disregard by the Engineering recipient teams for the information that 
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was available to them from the Business source. Second, the results show that while the 
initial performance within the FDBE condition lags the other treatments, there is also 
faster learning throughout the rest of the experiment. This finding is somewhat moot 
though, since throughout the experiment there remains a sizable performance deficit 
versus the other three conditions, ranging from 10% to 40%. These results corroborate 
past research (Dougherty, 1992; Ancona and Caldwell, 1992) that demonstrates the 
difficulty functionally diverse teams have with sharing thoughts and effectively 
completing tasks, at least when the recipients were Engineering students. Interestingly, 
when the Business teams were receiving knowledge from the Engineering source, they 
reviewed it thoroughly and used the information, allowing them to get off to a good start.  
Perhaps this was because many of them saw this as an engineering task. Also, Business 
school students are asked to work across functional interests on a regular basis in classes, 
so being asked to work with knowledge received from engineers was not an unusual 
request. 
 Hypothesis 2 argues that task and process conflict will be higher within the 
functionally diverse conditions.  
 
Table 3.3: Self-Reported Changes  
 (between rounds) Period 1-2	 2-3	 3-4	 4-5	
Functional Diversity	 mean	 2.13 1.57	 0.83	 0.57	
Non-Functional Diversity	 mean 1.27	 0.73	 0.67	 0.43	
 p-value	 ≤0.01	 ≤0.01 0.41	 0.53	
Notes. Changes made between rounds were self-reported by production teams and validated by two Ph.D. students. 
The time between each round was given so that teams could review their 
operational strategy and make changes if necessary. Driven by the desire to achieve the 
highest financial compensation possible, it was in each team’s best interest to ensure a 
winning strategy was in place. After tallying the number of ideas per round and 
comparing teams within each treatment, a clear pattern emerges.  First, teams within the 
functionally diverse condition search far more than those in the non-functionally diverse 
conditions, especially in the first two rounds (see Table 3.3, with data aggregated to 
Functional Diversity vs. Non Functional Diversity because patterns were similar). A t-test 
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between FD vs. non-FD search activity exhibits a p-value of .005 between round 1 and 2 
and .001 between round 2 and 3. In rounds 3-4 and 4-5, the amount of changes was 
statistically the same between the two conditions. These findings are consistent with the 
performance results from tables 1 & 2 because it shows that FD teams are not satisfied 
with the process they inherit so they make significantly more changes to their process in 
an effort to adapt it and improve.  Conversely, those teams that received a template from 
their functional counterparts, followed their instructions from the onset, and largely kept 
the process in tact over time, which led to better performance overall. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 is confirmed.  Additionally, this data serves as further evidence that using a 
proven template provides an operational advantage because it allows workers to focus on 
execution vs. focusing on both knowledge creation and execution.  
3.5. Discussion   
The question guiding this study has been “Does functional diversity impact the 
effectiveness of a proven template when transferring production process knowledge?”  
This is a compelling question because as work is routinely being done across functional 
lines within today’s firms, it is important to know if that is the right approach, especially 
as it relates to the transfer of knowledge between multiple facilities. While there are other 
factors that could impact a firm’s ability to effectively transfer process knowledge, this 
paper demonstrates that executing work between functions can not only lead to a much 
slower start up in the recipient location, in certain contexts, but also increased levels of 
task and process conflict. Since production moves usually entail the movement of current 
business, firms cannot afford to have slow start-ups and high levels of conflict if they 
want to meet obligations to their supply chain/business partners. This implies that when 
management is organizing their transfer team, a good structure would be to have several 
“source-recipient” dyads, like what FEM eventually did during their move into Thailand. 
One dyad that is comprised of all key functions that are involved in the move, including 
Engineering, Manufacturing, Finance, Planning, Sourcing, Product Development, etc. 
This team can address and track progress across all elements (both key and trivial) of the 
process move. There should also be function specific dyads that are not functionally 
diverse, with its sole focus on the elements of the move that are important to that function 
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(e.g. Mfg. to Mfg.; Supply Planning to Supply Planning, etc.). This will ensure that the 
function specific knowledge of the production process is transferred properly, while also 
leveraging the collective creativity and knowledge of multiple functions. 
 In chapter 4, I investigate the role of National Culture. This factor is important to 
study because many of the production moves are happening between countries and 
therefore between cultures.  I motivate the topic with a case example from ChiPak, who 
are going through a move from Asia (eastern hemisphere) to the Caribbean (western 
hemisphere) and have had some difficulty doing so. The topic of national culture builds 
well on chapter 3s discussion of functional diversity because in some past literature, 
collocation, which is similar to functional diversity, is seen as a way to mitigate the 
effects of culture changes. Therefore, I also investigate collocation and its impact on 
performance within and between cultures. 
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Chapter 4: 
National Culture and its Impact on 
Knowledge Transfer Effectiveness 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Customers, competitors, investors and other stakeholders often pressure firms to shift 
production to alternative locations within and between countries. This pressure is usually 
due to a desire to reduce costs, expand current business, increase service capability, etc. 
Firms can be tempted to focus on the post-move value, discounting the effort it takes to 
execute a successful move. Moving a process is not a trivial exercise, and requires the 
firm to manage several strategic decisions, such as the location of new facility, 
brownfield vs. greenfield site (Gaimon et al. 2017), old vs. new equipment, etc. Perhaps 
the most important aspect of planning a move is how to effectively transfer the 
knowledge associated with the existing process. Knowledge transfer is important because 
the ability to share knowledge between units is a competitive advantage for firms (Argote 
and Ingram, 2000). Effectively managing knowledge transfer is challenging because 
knowledge is stored in members, tools and tasks (Argote 2013). Frequently, knowledge is 
not stored in an explicit manner, but is stored in a tacit form (Nonaka 1994).  
 Consider the example of ChiPak9, a $100 million/yr. contract manufacturer based 
in China. ChiPak has been making parts and finished home goods since the 1970sin 
China. However, as production costs in China continued to rise between 2006-2014, the 
pressure from their large U.S. based customers pushed ChiPak to consider establishing a 
production presence in the Western hemisphere. After an exhaustive study, ChiPak chose 
a location in the Caribbean, due to the attractive labor costs, tax advantages and its 
                                                
9 We use the name “ChiPak” to conceal the actual identity of this company. We generally refer to their new 
location as “Caribbean” for confidentiality purposes as well. 
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proximity to customer facilities. They made a commitment to their customers to move at 
least 50% of their current production within 12 months. While most elements of the move 
(building acquisition, equipment installation) went well, ChiPak struggled to hire people 
who could match the level of skill, work ethic and performance of their Chinese workers. 
Often times during the interviewing process, Chipak would uncover a misalignment of 
expectations regarding the breadth and depth of worker responsibilities, including amount 
of work per person and product quality expectations. When they did find people whose 
work expectations were aligned with the company, many of them would quit during 
training because the process was long and arduous. Due to these difficulties, ChiPak had 
to adjust its scheduled move, extending the time horizon for a 50% move to two years, 
instead of one. In retrospect, ChiPak underestimated the cultural differences they would 
encounter when moving away from China to a location where skill level, work standards, 
norms and values are different. 
 As this example highlights, a production move can be even more challenging 
when a firm moves from one culture to another. However, many moves happen between 
cultures. For example, Ford announced in 2016 that they would be moving all small car 
production (e.g. Ford Focus) from the US to Mexico, due to lower production costs. In 
2015, GE announced a plan to move final production of aero-derivatives turbines from 
the US to France, Hungary and China, to take advantage of available export financing in 
Europe. In 2014, Honeywell moved the production of electronic industrial control units 
from the US to Mexico, laying off over 100 workers in Pennsylvania. 
  
In this study, we focus on two countries, United States and China, who are at the 
center of the globalization discussion and have very distinct cultures when compared to 
one another:  Multiple studies (Chen et al 2015; Cohen et al. 2016; Sirkin et al. 2014) 
have offered evidence showing a great deal of production movement between the two 
countries in both directions. So we want to understand if the differences between these 
two cultures specifically impact manufacturing performance after a production move. 
Ultimately, our goal is to inform managerial strategy on how to manage a production 
move effectively between two countries that have unique cultures that are very different 
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from each other. Therefore, the questions that guide our research are: Does national 
culture matter when moving a production process from one culture to another? If national 
culture matters, what strategies can managers use to counter these effects? We investigate 
these questions via a series of in-depth, cross-cultural behavioral experiments that took 
place in the U.S. and in China. 
 The following section examines relevant literature, theory and the hypotheses. 
Section 3 details our experimental design and the analysis of results.  Lastly, we highlight 
the strategic and operational implications of the study, its limitations and explore future 
research directions. 
 
4.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
Culture and its Impact on the Organization and on Operations 
 
With the expansion of globalization over the last few decades, national culture and its 
impact on organizations has become an important research topic. Hofstede describes 
national culture as “the collective programming of the mind, distinguishing one group or 
category of people from others” (Hofstede et al. 2010). Hofstede’s 1980 study has formed 
the foundation for how researchers have approached the study of culture and management 
in general (Flynn and Saladin 2006). Hofstede (1980) uses data gathered from IBM 
employees across 70 countries from 1967-1973. From this extensive data collection, 
Hofstede developed several cultural dimensions and discussed how the various countries 
differ on each. He initially proposed four dimensions: individualism/collectivism, power 
distance, masculinity/femininity, and uncertainty avoidance, and has since added two 
more: long term orientation and indulgence. 
 Individualism can be described as a social pattern that consists of loosely linked 
individuals who view themselves as independent of collectives and who are motivated by 
their own preferences, needs, rights and contracts. Conversely, collectivism can be 
described as a social pattern that consists of closely linked individuals who see 
themselves as belonging to one or more collectives (e.g. family, coworkers, in-groups, 
organizations) and who are motivated by norms, duties, and obligations which are 
imposed by the collectives. Power distance can be defined as the extent to which the less 
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powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country accept that power is 
distributed unequally. Masculinity can be defined as having a preference for achievement, 
heroism, and material rewards for success.  Conversely, femininity describes having a 
preference for cooperation, modesty, and quality of life. Uncertainty avoidance is the 
degree to which people in the society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Long-term orientation is defined as fostering of pragmatic virtues oriented toward future 
rewards, in particular perseverance, thrift, and adapting to changing circumstances. Lastly, 
indulgence is when a society allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural 
human desires related to enjoying life and having fun (Hofstede et al. 2010, pg. 519-522). 
While national culture may have an impact on the entire organization, it is 
important that we understand its impact on Operations in particular. There are several 
studies that help develop our intuition as well as show how culture can influence 
operational performance. Flynn and Saladin (2006) sought to understand the role of 
national culture when implementing quality management programs. Armed with plant 
data from the World Class Manufacturing (WCM) project, they used the Malcolm 
Baldrige quality award framework and Hofstede’s national culture dimensions to test 
correlations between the two. They find that national culture dimensions (Power Distance, 
Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism, Masculinity) are related to performance. 
Ultimately, their analysis shows that there “is not a universal model for performance 
excellence and that practices and approaches should be adapted to the local culture” 
(Flynn and Saladin 2006, pg. 599). 
 Pagell et al. (2005) sought to test the validity of national culture as an explanatory 
variable for global operations decision-making. Essentially, they wanted to understand 
“why might resident managers based in different countries pursue significantly different 
approaches when faced with the same set of decisional factors (page 374)?” Using data 
collected for the Global Manufacturing Research Group (GMRG), as well as Hofstede’s 
culture framework, they analyze sourcing, sales and forecasting decisions that are made 
across multiple countries and cultures.  They present evidence across each decision area 
that shows how national culture drove variation in the differences between countries, 
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confirming the author’s initial hypothesis. .  They also find that culture is not one-
dimensional; countries may differ on one element of culture but not all.  
 Naor et al. (2010) investigate if organizational culture differs across countries. 
They also examine and how this concept relates to national culture. The paper also 
studies the congruence between organizational and national culture, and they examine 
how these two concepts affect manufacturing performance (cost, quality, delivery and 
flexibility). The authors argue that the interplay between both concepts is important, 
because if, for example, best practices or templates are shared globally, there may be 
cultural conflicts in certain locations. Using the 9 dimensions within the GLOBE national 
culture framework, along with data collected via the high-performance manufacturing 
(HPM) project, they find that national culture is related to manufacturing performance 
across all dimensions of the Globe framework. 
 Gray and Massimino (2014) seeks to understand if language and national cultural 
differences between a firm’s headquarters and its manufacturing operation impact the 
operation’s process compliance. Process compliance is defined as the “adherence to 
operational routines such as standard operation procedures, good manufacturing practices 
(GMPs), and governmental regulations” (pg. 1042). Using the sender-receiver model 
framework (Noorderhaven and Harzing 2009) as well as Hofstede’s national culture 
dimensions, the authors use pharmaceutical industry FDA inspection data and find mixed 
results when testing for a link between national culture and process compliance.  For two 
of the culture dimensions (power distance and uncertainty avoidance) they found a link to 
process compliance, but for long term orientation and individualism, there was no 
congruence. 
In Ozer et al. 2014, the authors were interested in better understanding how 
dealing with partners within and across different cultures impacts trust, trustworthiness 
and information sharing within a supply chain. They created a repeated interaction 
experimental design that included subjects from culturally heterogeneous locations - one 
culture being collectivist (China) and the other culture being individualistic (U.S.A.). 
This design was unique and perhaps the only behavioral operations experiment between 
two countries until the current study. Within the experiment, there was a two-tier supply 
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chain where one subject is the supplier and the other subject is the retailer that is 
providing forecast information to the supplier.  The authors provide several key findings.  
First, on average, Chinese retailers inflate forecast information twice as much as U.S. 
retailers do. Chinese suppliers also rely less on the retailer’s forecast when determining 
the production quantity. This lack of trust can lead to a 10% loss in supply chain profit 
and efficiency. The authors partially attribute this lack of trust from the Chinese on their 
national culture and institutional environment. Specifically, they posit that the collectivist 
orientation within Chinese culture restricts trust and trustworthiness “within one’s tight 
social network”, which formed due to family ties or a long-term relationship.  Second, 
their analysis of within-country and cross-country supply chains shows that both the 
Chinese and U.S. individuals trust U.S. partners more than Chinese ones.  
 
National Culture and Knowledge Management 
 
National culture and its impact on knowledge management has been studied previously.  
Although previous papers do not address the topic in the same manner as the current 
study, there are several studies helpful in framing our theory and related hypotheses.   
 Bhagat et al. (2002) generates theory regarding how information can be 
transferred effectively across country borders between organizations with different 
cultural backgrounds. Borrowing largely from De Long and Fahey (2000), Garud and 
Nayyar (1994) and Hofstede, they create a conceptual model where they analyze three 
types of knowledge: human, social and structured.  Human knowledge involves what 
individuals know or know how to do.  Social knowledge exists in relationships among 
individuals or within groups and is largely tacit since it consists of cultural norms that are 
generated by working together. Structured knowledge is embedded in organizational 
systems, processes, rules and routines and is largely explicit (pg. 206-207). They use 
these types of knowledge, coupled with various dimensions of knowledge to make 
propositions about how individualist (e.g. U.S.) and collectivist (e.g. China) cultures may 
differ in regards to knowledge transfer effectiveness. They argue, for example, that 
individualist cultures value explicit knowledge over tacit, whereas collectivists ones 
value tacit over explicit knowledge. Thus, transferring knowledge between dissimilar 
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cultures will lead to reduced transfer effectiveness. Also, organizations located in 
individualist cultures are better able to transfer and absorb knowledge that is more 
explicit and independent, meaning it does not have to be described in relation to a larger 
body of knowledge. Lastly, they propose that individualist cultures may have difficulty 
transferring knowledge to collectivist ones, who may place more emphasis on collective 
goals and who are more relational. 
 Javidan et. al. (2005) discuss the case of NORDED, a Nordic European business 
school who established a training agreement with Tai Bank to train a number of Tai’s 
middle and upper-middle managers for one year on leadership and management of 
change. Tai wanted quality advice from a reputable Western organization, but also 
wanted to ensure that their culture was not ignored while being trained. The program 
started well, but as the training went on frustration mounted within the Tai employees as 
they had difficulty implementing what they learned from NORDED into their local 
environment. NORDED instructors soon realized that what they were teaching clashed 
with the Tai Bank culture, where there is communication and information flow is vertical 
and there is a clear hierarchy that must be followed. NORDED believed that this style 
stifled the creativity and growth of middle managers as these managers had very little 
decision authority. This article also introduces the GLOBE study, which is seen as 
another substantive piece of culture research, along with Hofstede’s work.  There are nine 
dimensions and the authors discuss these dimensions in general, as well as in the context 
of the NORDED/Tai Bank case study. The authors conclude that knowledge transfer by 
itself poses challenges, so when the prospect of moving knowledge across cultures is 
introduced, it can pose additional issues. Executives should take a “proactive and 
systematic approach to dealing with cultural differences”.   
 With this literature in mind, we believe there may be particular challenges when 
knowledge is passed from U.S. to China and from China to the U.S. We also believe that 
U.S. based teams will be more receptive to a template, and therefore will perform the task 
at a higher level than the Chinese based teams. 
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  Hypothesis 1A: Transferring production knowledge between dissimilar 
cultures will lead to reduced performance vs. transferring knowledge between similar 
cultures. 
  Hypothesis 1B: Transferring production knowledge between a U.S. based 
source and recipient dyads will lead to better performance vs. transferring knowledge 
between Chinese based source and recipient dyads, when colocation is not present.  
 
Co-location 
 
With globalization more prevalent than ever, it is common to have employees with 
unique expertise, in different geographies, working on the same projects. This physical 
distance “decreases the probability that individuals meet by chance in hallways, at lunch, 
in front of closed elevators, or around the coffee machine. Distance hence decreases the 
chance of unplanned, serendipitous information transfer, and problem clarification” (Van 
den Bult and Moenaert 1998, pgs. S1-S2). Therefore, it is important that organizations 
employ strategies that foster better collaboration and communication between these co-
workers.  While technology (e.g. video conferencing, instant messaging, email) has 
helped to close the gap that physical distance creates, many firms still see co-location, or 
“bringing together personnel from different departments into the same location” (Kahn 
and McDonough 1997, pg. 162), as the most effective way to improve connectivity.  
 In fact, there is a solid track record of firms employing this strategy successfully. 
For over two decades, Ford has employed a co-location approach in five vehicle centers, 
where designers, engineers and other supply chain functions work together on common 
projects. Ford also found that the co-location of various engineering sub-teams led to the 
development of the Mustang (Peitrangelo, 1993). McDonnell-Douglas saw the successful 
integration of the engineering and production departments when co-location was 
employed (Bergstrom, 1991). Lastly, when Honda co-located their suppliers’ engineers 
with Honda’s engineering, design and production people, it led to a stronger supplier-
customer relationship. Various researchers have found that colocation leads to improved 
communication and collaboration (Van den Bulte and Moenaert 1998; Kahn and 
McDonough 1997) and to higher manufacturing conformance quality (Gray et al. 2015). 
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In fact, Gray et al. (2015) finds that the positive impact that colocation has on 
manufacturing quality is enhanced further when deployed in plants with a high level of 
tacit process knowledge. The authors find that it is important for firms to match their 
organizational design with strategies that will deliver the expected outcomes, especially 
as it relates to quality. 
 Even though colocation has its advantages, there are also potential drawbacks. 
Kahn and McDonough (1997) finds that while colocation leads to improved collaboration 
between R&D and Manufacturing, it does not lead to improved performance. Also, 
colocation comes at a high cost.  When firms like Apple, P&G, and Hewlett-Packard 
began to offshore their manufacturing to China in the 1990s/early 2000s, they mitigated 
their risk by collocating their U.S. technical staff in China for weeks at a time. In addition, 
they would periodically deploy other company personnel (e.g. Supply Planning, 
Purchasing, Finance, General Management) to China to ensure the business was running 
smoothly.  The travel costs alone factored into the millions of dollars each year.  Net, 
while there may be benefits to collocating personnel, companies may find it to be too 
costly or time-consuming, especially when it happens between countries (Kahn and 
McDonough 1997). 
 In addition to gaining a better understanding of how national culture impacts 
knowledge transfer effectiveness, we are interested in understanding if colocation plays a 
role in mitigating the effects that culture may present during knowledge transfer. In this 
study, we transfer knowledge within and between U.S. and China based teams and assess 
their ability to take the knowledge to perform a production related task. The primary 
vehicle of knowledge transfer is a process template, which is knowledge in an explicit 
form. Bhagat et al (2002) finds that collectivist cultures are less likely than individualists 
to emphasize the significance of information that is written and codified and are more 
likely than individualists to disregard such information. To that end, collectivist cultures 
value tacit knowledge more than explicit knowledge. With this in mind, we anticipate 
that when transferring knowledge to a collectivist culture, having a source representative 
collocated with the recipient teams may improve transfer effectiveness. Especially since 
past literature (Gray et al 2015) finds colocation to be more valuable when transferring 
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tacit information. Conversely, introducing colocation when transferring to an 
individualist culture will not improve performance.  
   
   
 Hypothesis 2A: Co-location will lead to better performance for Chinese recipient 
teams vs. when co-location is not present. 
 Hypothesis 2B: Co-location will not lead to better performance for U.S. based 
recipient teams vs. when co-location is not present. 
 
Power Distance and its Impact on Search and Conflict 
We are also interested in understanding if there will be a difference between cultures in 
its desire to make changes to the production process that has been transferred into its 
facilities. Change is important because no company operates in a static environment and 
many companies regard a process move as an opportunity to change the product or 
process itself.  
 If we look at Hofstede’s research to develop intuition regarding which cultural 
dimension(s) may apply to a cultures desire to make/not make changes, we focus on one: 
Power Distance. This dimension is defined as: “the extent to which the less powerful 
members of institutions and organizations within a country accept that power is 
distributed unequally” (Hofstede et al. 2010, pg. 61). In China, power distance is high; 
the subordinate-superior relationship tends to be polarized and there is no defense against 
power abuse by superiors. People are influenced by formal authority and believe that one 
should not aspire beyond their rank (Hofstede et al. 2010). With this in mind, a Chinese 
participant may be more resistant to change the process given to them, as they may see 
the template as a form of authority providing strict guidance. Conversely, in the U.S., 
power distance is low, which is not surprising when you consider the emphasis on equal 
rights in all aspects of American society. In U.S. organizations, “hierarchy is established 
for convenience, superiors are accessible and managers rely on individual employees and 
teams for their expertise” (Hofstede.com).  Between managers and those who report to 
them, “communication is informal, direct and participative to a degree” (Hofstede.com). 
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Jehn et al. 1999 states that when teams disagree on “what to do” within a task 
assignment, that is task conflict. When they disagree on “how to do it” within a task 
assignment, that is process conflict. We argue that teams from a culture that is low in 
Power Distance, like the U.S., will seek to make more changes to the process they are 
inheriting.  Whereas, the teams from a culture that has a high level of Power Distance, 
like China, will not seek to cause conflict by making changes.  In our experiment, we 
track the changes made by each team and aggregate it by culture in table 4.4. We use 
these changes10 as a proxy for conflict because it shows that teams are not content with 
doing what has been given to them, so they are searching for an optimized solution via 
changes to the process. In past literature, researchers (Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003; 
Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005, etc.) discuss search as a way to describe how firms must 
look for a combination of design choices that will lead to the best possible performance. 
We expect the U.S. recipients to play a more active role in shaping their work when they 
receive a production process. Even if there is a prescriptive template, they feel 
empowered to communicate and express themselves. With this in mind, we present our 
final hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 3: Due to the differences in Power Distance, task and process conflict 
will be higher within U.S. recipient teams than within Chinese recipient teams.  
 
4.3 Experimental Design 
 
Operationalizing a Production Process, National Culture and Co-location 
In this study, we use Lego building sets to simulate a production process.  Within 
rigorous academic research, there is a long history of using Legos. In Ariely et al. (2008), 
the authors, via a Lego building exercise, showed that when subjects could see their 
finished work accumulate versus it being disassembled over time, they were far more 
productive. Staats et al. (2012) used Legos to study the effects of adding people to project 
teams. They found that managers often focus on the advantages of additional manpower 
                                                
10 The number of unique ideas generated between each round was tracked.  These ideas were self-reported 
by each participating team and independently validated by two PhD. candidates. 
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and underestimate the disadvantages, including coordination difficulties. Moreau and 
Engeset (2016) assigned subjects a well-defined task – a Lego kit with step-by-step 
instructions — as well as an ill-defined task – a bag of Lego bricks and pieces. They find 
that those who were initially given a well-defined task were not equipped to effectively 
manage an ill-defined task that required creativity later. Lastly, Kent and Siemsen (2017) 
leverage Lego building sets to study the impact of using templates when transferring 
production knowledge during a production process move.  They find that template use 
drives better performance at the recipient site.  However, they also find that strictly 
enforcing the template erodes performance; so the recipients must be allowed to make 
changes. 
 In our study of national culture, we focus on two countries that are not only at the 
center of the globalization and production move discussion, but who also represent very 
unique cultures.  With many companies choosing to move their production from the U.S. 
to China, or China to the U.S. (Chen et al. 2015; Cohen et al. 2016), we want to 
understand if their cultural differences impact how knowledge is transferred. To represent 
the two countries, we recruited 320 students: 160 students from a large university in 
Midwestern United States and 160 students from a large university in Mainland China. 
We divided each group into 40 teams of 4 people, for a total of 80 teams (40 U.S. & 40 
China). Since we are interested in understanding how national culture impacts 
knowledge transfer , we had a team of people in the U.S. and a team of people in China 
create a template based off the one used for the Lego Sunset Speeder (Lego No. 31017). 
These teams served as our “source” of knowledge within the experiment. This was done 
before we recruited the 320 experiment participants. Developing a template is key 
because even though each Lego building kit contains step-by-step instructions on how to 
build the product, there is no guidance given regarding the most efficient way to build it. 
Since the device has 32 steps and over 100 parts, the template is designed to deliver an 
optimal workflow that considers division of labor, material flow and the physical 
arrangement of the workers.  
 As previously mentioned, we are also interested in the impact colocation has on 
knowledge transfer, especially as it relates to mitigating the potentially negative effects of 
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national culture. The way we operationalize colocation in our experiments is by having a 
member of the source team for the template (either U.S. or China), sit in with recipient 
teams to help guide them through their entire session. The collocated person does not 
help to build the device, but gives advice on how to not only interpret the template but 
he/she also suggests changes that can be made between rounds to improve performance. 
 
4.3.1 Methods 
Each of the teams was assigned to build a Lego device as quickly as possible with no 
defects for five rounds. In each round, teams started with a bag filled with unsorted Lego 
pieces. There were 10 teams in each of the 8 treatments, or 80 teams total. Similar to past 
studies interested in learning effects (Epple et al. 1991; Darr et al. 1995, etc.), time acts as 
a proxy for cost in our experiment. Devices considered defective had to be reassembled 
to conform to specifications before a round counted as complete; as such, quality defects 
only appear in our analysis as time delays. 
 Our unit of analysis in this study was the four-person production team. We varied 
three factors in the experiment: Source, Recipient and Colocation. We implemented 
these three factors in a 23 full factorial between-subjects design, giving us 8 treatments. 
As such, each team knew only of the experimental group it was in. 
Table 4.1: Experimental Treatments 
Treatment Source Recipient Colocation 
1 US US No 
2 US US Yes 
3 US China No 
4 US China Yes 
5 China China No 
6 China China Yes 
7 China US No 
8 China US Yes 
All teams were given five minutes to discuss their approach before the start of the 
first round. They were also given three minutes between rounds to reassess their approach 
and adjust their process. Note that we allowed the teams within all conditions to make 
changes between rounds. In that sense, the template given to them only represents a 
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starting point for all teams. This design choice was made to allow adaptation by all teams 
across all experimental conditions. Per hypothesis 3, we kept track of the number of 
changes made by each team, so that we could assess if power distance was a factor in the 
level of task and process conflict within each team. 
All participants were guaranteed $5 for completing the experiment, and each 
member of a four-person team received the same compensation.  In addition, teams had 
an incentive to deliver high performance because more money was possible based on a 
tiered compensation structure tied to completion time (see appendix for experiment 
instructions). 
4.3.2 Analysis and Results 
Even though teams in both countries had 5 minutes before the first round to understand 
their task and strategize, how they used this time was uniquely different. The U.S. teams 
usually spent more time reading the template and talking about what it meant, while the 
Chinese teams usually spent the majority of their time asking questions of the researcher. 
This trend was exacerbated in the colocation sessions, as the Chinese teams listened to 
and ask questions of the collocated member, while the U.S. teams still chose to focus on 
the written template as well as the team members who were actually going to build the 
device. Between rounds, the teams were given several minutes to talk about their 
performance and make changes if they desired.  Again, there was a different approach 
taken in each country.  In the U.S., the team members spent their time brainstorming 
changes they could make to the process.  Conversely, the Chinese teams spent their time 
discussing their roles/responsibilities and talked about how they can do their template 
mandated jobs better.  Table 4 shows the difference in changes made between teams in 
both countries. As you can see, the U.S. based teams searched more frequently, which by 
itself doesn’t mean there will be better performance, but it may offer some clues. 
 Before sharing more detailed statistical analysis, it is useful to examine our data 
descriptively. Table 1 lists descriptive statistics across different time periods for all 8 
experimental conditions.  
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Table 4.2: Average Times to Complete Product 
Condition Period 1 2 3 4 5 
U.S. to U.S. Mean 
11.05 8.12 6.71 6.08 4.91 
Std. Dev. 1.00 1.98 1.68 0.87 0.53 
0U.S. to U.S. (collocated) Mean 
12.13 8.41 7.21 6.09 5.21 
Std. Dev. 1.10 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.53 
U.S. to China 
 
Mean 16.56 11.25 8.53 7.20 6.07 
Std. Dev. 2.64 1.91 2.16 2.48 1.28 
U.S. to China (collocated) Mean 
11.78 9.09 8.02 6.56 6.06 
Std. Dev. 1.18 0.40 1.15 1.40 1.39 
China to China Mean 
18.13 10.36 8.95 6.53 7.11 
Std. Dev. 3.51 1.65 2.14 0.69 3.57 
China to China (collocated) Mean 
11.58 8.05 6.72 5.93 5.38 
Std. Dev. 1.27 1.16 1.17 0.85 0.91 
China to U.S. Mean 
13.41 8.70 6.99 5.91 5.74 
Std. Dev. 1.76 0.91 0.99 0.63 0.78 
China to U.S. (collocated) Mean 
12.60 8.96 7.29 6.19 5.75 
Std. Dev. 1.55 1.23 1.09 0.87 0.88 
Notes. Time is measured in minutes required to complete a product according to specifications. 
 
There are several key takeaways from the descriptive data. First, the standard 
learning curve (i.e. time decreasing at a decreasing rate) is present across all the 
treatments. Second, colocation improved the performance of the Chinese teams.  Not 
only was the impact of colocation noticeable for completion time, but it also reduced the 
variation between teams per round. Lastly, U.S. teams performed substantially better than 
Chinese, especially when colocation was not present.  The average difference between 
US and China team performance per round is 13%. 
To analyze our data more formally, we estimated a model that allowed us to 
differentiate learning curves across our experimental conditions. In accordance with H1 
and H2, we were especially interested in examining whether the parameters of the 
learning curve, i.e., the initial time to build the product (=a) and the learning rate (=b), 
changed across different experimental conditions, specifically national culture and 
colocation. We applied the standard power law of learning in our model and used natural 
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logs to linearize the model. Further, our model needed to account for the differences in 
learning curves across teams. Because we only observed teams for a few periods, we 
captured different learning curves across teams through random slopes and intercepts. 
Our model specification was as follows: 
ln (tp(i)) = ln (ai) - bi ln(p) + SusRusChighi  (a1 – b1 ln (p)) + SusRcnChighi  (a2 – b2 ln (p) 
+ SusRcnClowi   (a3 – b3 ln (p)) + ScnRcnChighi  (a4 – b4 ln (p)) + ScnRcnClowi   (a5 – b5 ln (p)) + 
ScnRusChighi  (a6 – b6 ln (p))+ ScnRusClowi  (a7 – b7 ln (p)) + εp 
 
In this specification, tp(i) refers to the duration of building the product for team i in 
period p. The constant ai and the slope bi are the parameters of the learning curve for 
team i, drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with standard deviations σa, σb and 
correlation coefficient ρab. This aspect of our model allowed us to efficiently represent 
the data structure of multiple observations being nested in the same team while explicitly 
recognizing that the parameters of the learning curve of a team are likely correlated with 
each other so that longer initial task durations likely imply steeper learning curves. The 
dummy variables Si, Ri and Ci (for source, recipient and colocation) capture the 
experimental condition of team i and shift both the intercept and slope of the learning 
curve. Finally, deviations from the power law of learning are permitted through the 
random error term εp, which is distributed normally with period specific standard 
deviation σp. This aspect of our model allowed us to capture heteroscedasticity in the data 
caused by later periods possibly exhibiting less noise than earlier periods. The model was 
estimated in Stata 14.2 using the “mixed” procedure. Results from the estimation are 
summarized in Table 2.  
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Table 4.3 - Estimation Results from Random Effects Learning Curve Model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
China to China 0.46** (0.06) 
China to U.S. 0.18** (0.06) 
U.S. to China 0.23** (0.08) 
U.S. to U.S. x Colocation 0.09 (0.06) 
China to China x Colocation -0.52** (0.08) 
China to U.S. x Colocation -0.14 (0.08) 
U.S. to China x Colocation -0.23* (0.12) 
ln(p) -0.47** (0.04) 
ln(p) x China to China -0.20** (0.05) 
ln(p) x China to US -0.10† (0.05) 
ln(p) x U.S. to China 0.14† (0.08) 
ln(p) x U.S. to U.S. x Colocation -0.04 (0.05) 
ln(p) x China to China x Colocation 0.22** (0.08) 
ln(p) x China to U.S. x Colocation 0.1 (0.80) 
ln(p) x U.S. to China x Colocation -0.08 (0.11) 
Constant 2.40** (0.04) 
σa 0.10** (0.02) 
σb 0.08** (0.02) 
ρab -0.36** (0.28) 
σ1 0.10** (0.02) 
σ2 0.12** (0.01) 
σ3 0.14** (0.01) 
σ4 0.10** (0.01) 
σ5 0.16** (0.02) 
N 400 [80]  
χ2 1680.39**  
Notes. **p≤0.01; *p≤0.05; †p≤0.10. N refers to the number of observations, with the number of teams in brackets. 
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There are several key findings from our analysis. H1A argues that the 
performance of cross-cultural teams will lag behind that of the within culture teams.  This 
is confirmed, as the average intercept of the cross culture teams is higher, which means 
their initial completion times were significantly slower.  H1B argues that the performance 
of the U.S. recipient teams will outpace that of the Chinese recipient teams when 
colocation is not present. This is also confirmed, since the times of the Chinese teams 
were much slower than the U.S. teams throughout the experiment.  In both cases, the 
Cross Culture and Chinese teams have learning rates in line with the group we are 
comparing them to, however in the case of the Chinese vs. U.S. teams it is of little 
consequence, since the actual performance gap still remains throughout the experiment. 
The Chinese teams underperform the U.S. teams by an average of 25% each round when 
collocation is not present. 
 In H2A and H2B, we argue that colocation will matter for Chinese recipient teams 
but will not matter for U.S. teams.  Both of these hypotheses were confirmed in 
resounding fashion.  For the Chinese teams, colocation made a difference in not only how 
they started,  but also how quickly they learned over time.  Also, colocation served as a 
way to standardize performance, as the average standard deviations for both US to China 
collocated and China-to-China collocated were reduced (see Table 1). Conversely, the 
performance of U.S. teams was not improved and in fact when adding colocation to the 
U.S to U.S. knowledge transfer dyad, the performance was made worse. These results are 
consistent with what we observed in the experimental sessions, as the Chinese teams 
were eager to learn from someone who had previous experience. The U.S. teams, 
however, did not see the collocated person as value added since he/she was not helping to 
build the device. 
 In Hypothesis 3, we argue that due in part to the established Power Distance 
difference between China and the U.S. (Hofstede 1980), U.S. teams will be more willing 
to make changes (i.e. higher task and process conflict) to their inherited process than the 
Chinese.  This is driven by the fact that Chinese teams will be hesitant to change the 
template they have been given, seeing them as “orders” vs. general guidance that 
can/should be improved upon. Understanding if one culture will be more willing to 
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search/change is an important factor, because it has been established in past literature that 
firms that have a desire to search for ways to improve their design choices will perform 
better (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005). This hypothesis is also 
confirmed, as Table 4.4 shows a substantial difference in the self reported changes made 
by the U.S. vs. Chinese teams. It could also be argued that the U.S. teams’ desire to make 
changes to their inherited process is one of the reasons why their performance in the 
experiment is better than the Chinese. 
 
Table 4.4: Self-Reported Changes – U.S. vs. China 
(between rounds) Period 1	 2	 3	 4	
U.S. Recipient mean 1.675	 1.1	 0.4	 0.475 
China Recipient mean 0.25	 0.3	 0.125	 0.075	
 
p-value ≤0.01	 ≤0.01	 ≤0.01	 ≤0.01 
Notes. Changes made between rounds were self-reported by production teams and validated by two Ph.D. students. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
Does national culture matter when moving production process knowledge from one 
culture to another?  This is an important question because the increase of globalization is 
driving firms to move their production between countries to take advantage of lower 
production costs, tax advantages, customer access, etc.  Movement is happening at a 
rapid pace and will continue to increase, especially as production costs in China increase, 
making them on par or higher than U.S. costs (BCG report, citation needed). And if 
national culture matters and the impact is negative, what strategies can be implemented to 
neutralize these effects? This is key because we not only want to diagnose potential 
issues that may arise during a move, but also prescribe solutions that will help firms 
reduce the effect of the issues and thereby drive project success. We investigated these 
questions through a series of in depth, cross-cultural behavioral experiments that took in 
place at universities in the U.S. and China. 
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 We find that transferring production knowledge between cultures is more difficult 
than transferring within cultures, especially in the initial stages. The impact we saw 
would have been even more substantial if not for the difficulty Chinese recipient teams 
had in general with receiving explicit knowledge in the form of a template, even when it 
was from a Chinese source. This leads to our second finding, which is that U.S. teams 
performed better than Chinese teams with the explicit knowledge (template) that was 
transferred and while the learning rates over time between the two countries were similar, 
the U.S. teams still outpaced their Chinese counterparts in completion time by an average 
of 25% per round when colocation is not present, and 13% when it was. This result is 
consistent with past literature (Bhagat et al. 2002) that argues that individualist countries, 
like the U.S., find more value in explicit knowledge than collectivist countries (like China) 
do. 
 We investigated colocation as a strategy that can serve as a way to mitigate the 
negative cultural effects. Colocation, or the “bringing together of personnel from 
different departments into the same location” (Kahn and McDonough 1997, pg. 162), 
increases the amount of tacit knowledge being shared and this form of knowledge is what 
collectivist countries value more than explicit knowledge (Bhagat et. al. 2002). Within 
our experiment, colocation significantly impacted the performance of the Chinese, 
improving their initial performance and the learning rate over time.  
 Lastly, we wanted to understand if established cultural differences, like those 
presented by Hofstede (1980) would drive unique behaviors among the recipient teams as 
it relates to searching for ways to improve the process they inherited. Among the 
dimensions posited by Hofstede’s research, we focus on Power Distance, which is the 
“extent to which less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a 
country accept that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede 2010, pg. 61). For 
collectivist countries like China, power distance is high, for the U.S. it’s low. We tracked 
the number of self reported changes made per team between rounds and find that the 
Chinese, even when they weren’t performing well, would not change the process they 
inherited.  Conversely, the U.S. teams changed their processes often, especially in the 
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first two rounds, and this likely was a reason why their performance was better, in 
addition to the fact that explicit knowledge suits their cultural disposition.  
 Taken together, these results show that when moving production process 
knowledge between unique cultures, there must be consideration taken for the ways in 
which each culture best receives knowledge.  There is no “one size fits all” strategy so a 
firm must craft a plan specific to the needs of the recipient facility, otherwise the results 
will likely delay the start up, thereby putting current and future business at risk; not to 
mention harming the reputation of the firm. 
  
 78 
 
Chapter 5: 
Conclusion 
 Production process moves have received minimal attention from scholars. While 
current research analyzes the what, why and where of production moves, the how remains 
relatively unexplored. Through discussions with multinational firms who have undergone 
both intercontinental and domestic moves over the last two decades, I identified several 
factors that may enhance or erode a firm’s ability to transfer valuable yet elusive process 
knowledge. To better understand the link between these factors and performance, I 
created laboratory experiments to analyze cause and effect at a deep level. While there 
are other major factors that may impact a production move, like the greenfield vs. 
brownfield decision (Gaimon et al. 2017), this research makes a meaningful contribution 
to existing theory and has the potential to benefit practitioners. 
 This dissertation consisted of three chapters, with each chapter addressing a factor 
that may enhance or erode a firm’s ability to transfer knowledge (Figure 5.1, repeated 
from Figure 1.1). 
Figure 5.1 – Dissertation Structure 
 
 In chapter 2, I studied the link between template use and post move performance.  
Templates have long been thought of as an effective way to transfer knowledge, but it has 
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also been shown to have limitations too.  My research demonstrated that template use 
does lead to increased post move performance. Not only does the template allow teams to 
learn faster over time, but it also reduced the variability between teams. However, I also 
find that strict enforcement of the template crowds out empowerment and motivation 
among the recipient teams, leading to reduced performance. Therefore, firms engaged in 
moving production should create production templates to codify both critical and non-
critical forms of knowledge, but should also leave some flexibility for the recipient to 
adapt the template to their unique skills, assets and environment. These findings serve as 
a solid foundation for the remainder of my dissertation, as I began to investigate factors 
that could enhance or erode the effectiveness of a proven template. 
 In chapter 3, I create a laboratory experiment that allows me to analyze the 
impact of between team functional diversity while transferring production knowledge. 
Having a diverse set of expertise and functional disciplines on the team is broadly 
thought of as the best approach when managing projects within the firm, but past 
literature has been divided, with some studies finding benefits while others find 
deficiencies with this approach. Within the experiment, production knowledge is 
transferred within and between unique functions, specifically subjects with a Business 
background vs. those with a background in Engineering. The results show that when 
knowledge is transferred from Business to Engineering, there is a performance reduction, 
likely due to a lack of credibility given to the Business teams by the Engineers. However, 
when knowledge is transferred from the Engineers to Business teams, performance is in 
line with the “within function” results. I also find that when knowledge is transferred 
between functions, there is an increase in both task (what to do) and process (how to do) 
conflict. Taken together, the results show that functional diversity does not work for all 
settings, and that managers should employ this approach carefully. 
Finally, in chapter 4, I study the role that national culture plays in a firm’s ability 
to effectively transfer knowledge from a source to a recipient located in a different and 
unique culture. This topic is very timely, as most of the major moves over the last 20 
years have taken place between countries, especially when many U.S. firms (Apple, P&G, 
Wal-Mart, IBM, H-P, etc.) in the late 1990s and early 2000s decided to take advantage of 
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the low production costs in China. Also, over the last 5-7 years, firms are beginning to re-
shore their production back to the U.S. or nearby due to the increasing production costs in 
China. To replicate these moves, I ran experiments in the U.S. and China with subjects 
who are born and raised in these unique cultures. These cultures are very different on 
several key cultural dimensions, including individualism/collectivism and power distance. 
These cultural dimensions are engrained into the fabric of these people, so it was 
interesting to study how these differences showed up in the knowledge transfer exercise. 
The results show that between culture knowledge transfer leads to reduced performance. I 
also find that knowledge transfer within culture from U.S. to U.S. leads to better 
performance than China to China. This result is consistent with the idea that individualist 
cultures (e.g. U.S.) find more value in explicit knowledge than collectivist cultures (e.g. 
China) do. However, I also find that a mitigating strategy for the difficulty the Chinese 
experience is by collocating someone from the source of the knowledge with the recipient 
teams while they are building their device. This change greatly increases both initial 
learning and learning over time, and it reduces variability between teams. Conversely, 
collocation shows no effect on the performance of U.S. teams. This finding is also 
consistent with the idea that collectivist cultures find more value in tacit knowledge than 
individualist cultures do. Lastly, I find that, perhaps due to the differences in power 
distance, the U.S. teams had much higher task and process conflict than the Chinese. 
However, this conflict may have also been a contributing factor in the U.S. team’s ability 
to learn quicker than the Chinese as well. 
To highlight the similarities and differences between each chapter, I provide an 
overview of the dissertation in table 5.1. While I use behavioral experiments for all three 
essays, I differentiate them by first establishing a foundation for effective knowledge 
transfer (i.e. template use) and then investigate two factors (functional diversity and 
national culture) that may enhance or erode knowledge transfer effectiveness. While there 
are other factors that impact production move performance, my dissertation delivers 
insights that advance our current understanding of how knowledge is created, transferred 
and retained. These insights will not only advance academic theory, but also inform the 
way firms create strategies when engaged in moves. I also hope that the novel approach I 
 81 
took to study production process moves (laboratory experiments) will inspire future 
researchers to also develop creative research methods to gather data and drive the field 
forward. 
 
Table 5.1 Dissertation Summary 
 
		 Chapter #2 Chapter #3 Chapter #4 
Tittle Production Process 
Moves: Template Use 
and the Need to Adapt 
Functional Diversity and 
its Impact on Knowledge 
Transfer Effectiveness 
National Culture and its 
Impact on Knowledge 
Transfer Effectiveness 
Unit of Analysis Production Team Production Team Production Team 
Data (Years) Primary data (2015-
2016) 
Primary data (2016) Primary data (2017) 
Research 
Question(s) 
* Does template use 
lead to higher 
performance when 
transferring production 
process knowledge? 
*Does rigidly 
enforcing a template 
result in adverse 
behavioral 
consequences at the 
recipient site? 
*Does between team 
functional diversity 
impact the effectiveness 
of a proven template 
when transferring process 
knowledge? 
*Does national culture matter 
when moving a production 
process from one culture to 
another?  
*If national culture matters, 
what strategies can be 
implemented to neutralize 
these effects? 
Theoretical Lens Standardization, 
Empowerment, 
Motivation, 
Organizational Search 
Unique Thought Worlds, 
Homogenous Teams vs. 
Heterogeneous teams 
Hofstede's Cultural 
Dimensions, Co-location 
Research Method Mixed Effects 
Regression model 
Mixed Effects 
Regression model, T-
Test 
Mixed Effects Regression 
model, T-Test 
Firm Implications *Firms should 
create/use templates, 
but allow recipient 
facility to adjust. 
*Functional Diversity 
can lead to reduced 
performance, so firms 
should use heterogeneous 
teams selectively. 
*National culture matters, so 
firms should consider cultural 
differences when making 
productions move decisions.                         
*Firms should use 
"colocation" selectively 
because it does not always 
improve performance. 
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Appendix A  
Experiment Instructions for Chapter 2 study -  
Instructions for Chapter 3 and 4 studies based off of the 
Chapter 2 “Template High/Change None – Sunset 
Speeder” instructions. 
Production Process Moves Experiment 
Template High/Change None - “Sunset Speeder” (4-person team) 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating in our experiment: 
 
• You will be engaged in building a Lego Sunset Speeder for 5 rounds, working together as 
a team.   
 
• You have been assigned specific roles and responsibilities that you are expected to 
follow, even though you may begin to deviate from them after the first round (see below).  
 
• Cost (completion time) and Quality (# of errors) are very important and will be tracked.  
Your objective is to build this device as quickly as possible with zero defects.  
Completion time will serve as a proxy for cost, so each round will be timed from start to 
finish.  “Finish” will be when your team has submitted the device for final inspection and 
there are no defects/errors.   
 
• In addition to your base pay, you can earn additional compensation each round if you are 
able to complete the device, without defects, in the following completion times: 
 
o > 8 minutes = $1 
o 7 to 8 minutes = $2 
o 6 to 7 minutes = $3 
o 5 to 6 minutes = $4 
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o 4 to 5 minutes = $5 
o < 4 minutes = $6 
 
• Before you begin the first round, you will be given 5 minutes to discuss general strategy 
with one another.  Each round ends when the team has fully assembled the device.  
Between rounds, your team will be given 3 minutes to strategize ways to improve your 
device building operation.  If there are changes you want to make to the way you are 
organized, feel free to do so between rounds. 
 
• When the 3-minute strategy session has been completed between rounds, each team will 
be notified and a new bag of device components will be placed on the table signifying the 
start of the next round.  This will continue until the 5th round is completed. 
 
 
 
Team members should sit in the following fashion while making this device: 
 
 
 
Team Member Assignments 
 
Position: Builder #1  
 
• Responsible for steps 1-16 in Lego instructions. 
 
• Position: Builder #2 
 
• Responsible for steps 17-32 in Lego instructions, except for the 3 subassemblies in steps 
20, 24 and 32. 
• Will coordinate with Builder #3 to affix the subassemblies to the device at the appropriate 
time. 
 
• Position: Builder #3 
 
• Responsible for steps 20, 24 and 32, which are the subassemblies. 
• Will coordinate work with Builder #2 to affix the subassemblies to the device at the 
appropriate time.   
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• The goal is to have the subassemblies completed by the time builder #2 begins building 
in step 17, therefore Builder #3 should start building subassemblies at the same time as 
Builder #1. 
 
• Position: Material Sorter and Manager of Instructions  
 
• Responsible to manage Lego instructions, working alongside each of the builders to 
ensure the device is built accurately. 
• Responsible for sorting materials, helping each builder identify the correct parts to use to 
build the device.  Need to avoid using the defective/wrong materials that can lead to 
finish product errors. 
 
 
 
 
Production Process Moves Experiment 
Template High/Change High: “Red Go Kart” (4-person team) 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating in our experiment: 
 
• You will be engaged in building a Lego Go-Kart for 5 rounds, working together as a 
team.   
 
• You have been assigned specific roles and responsibilities that you are expected to 
follow, even though you may begin to deviate from them after the first round (see below).  
 
• Cost (completion time) and Quality (# of errors) are very important and will be tracked.  
Your objective is to build this device as quickly as possible with zero defects.  
Completion time will serve as a proxy for cost, so each round will be timed from start to 
finish.  “Finish” will be when your team has submitted the device for final inspection and 
there are no defects/errors.   
 
• In addition to your base pay, you can earn additional compensation each round if you are 
able to complete the device, without defects, in the following completion times: 
 
o > 8 minutes = $1 
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o 7 to 8 minutes = $2 
o 6 to 7 minutes = $3 
o 5 to 6 minutes = $4 
o 4 to 5 minutes = $5 
o < 4 minutes = $6 
 
• Before you begin the first round, you will be given 5 minutes to discuss general strategy 
with one another.  Each round ends when the team has fully assembled the device.  
Between rounds, your team will be given 3 minutes to strategize ways to improve your 
device building operation.  If there are changes you want to make to the way you are 
organized, feel free to do so between rounds. 
 
• When the 3-minute strategy session has been completed between rounds, each team will 
be notified and a new bag of device components will be placed on the table signifying the 
start of the next round.  This will continue until the 5th round is completed. 
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Team members should sit in the following fashion while making this device: 
 
 
 
Team Member Assignments 
 
Position: Builder #1  
 
• Responsible for steps 1-13 in Lego instructions. 
 
Position: Builder #2 
 
• Responsible for steps 14-34 in Lego instructions, except for the 3 subassemblies in steps 
28, 29 and 31. 
• Will coordinate with Builder #3 to affix the subassemblies to the device at the appropriate 
time. 
 
Position: Builder #3 
 
• Responsible for steps 28, 29 and 31, which are the subassemblies. 
• Will coordinate work with Builder #2 to affix the subassemblies to the device at the 
appropriate time.   
• The goal is to have the subassemblies completed by the time builder #2 begins building 
in step 14, therefore Builder #3 should start building subassemblies at the same time as 
Builder #1. 
 
Position: Material Sorter and Manager of Instructions  
 
• Responsible to manage Lego instructions, working alongside each of the builders to 
ensure the device is built accurately. 
• Responsible for sorting materials, helping each builder identify the correct parts to use to 
build the device.  Need to avoid using the defective/wrong materials that can lead to 
finish product errors. 
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Production Process Moves Experiment 
No Template/Change None - “Sunset Speeder” (4-person team) 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating in our experiments: 
 
• You will build the Lego Sunset Speeder device 5 times, working together as a team. 
 
• Cost (completion time) and Quality (# of errors) are very important and will be tracked.  
Your objective is to build this device as quickly as possible with zero defects.  
Completion time will serve as a proxy for cost, so each round will be timed from start to 
finish.  “Finish” will be when your team has submitted the device for final inspection and 
there are no defects/errors.   
 
• When building the device, your team may organize your operation however you like.  To 
help facilitate this, you will be given 5 minutes before you begin the first round to 
organize. 
 
• In addition to your base pay, you can earn additional compensation each round if you are 
able to complete the device, without defects, in the following times: 
 
o > 8 minutes = $1 
o 7 to 8 minutes = $2 
o 6 to 7 minutes = $3 
o 5 to 6 minutes = $4 
o 4 to 5 minutes = $5 
o < 4 minutes = $6 
 
• Each round ends when the team has fully assembled the device.  Between rounds, your 
team will be given 3 minutes to strategize ways to improve your operation. If there are 
changes you want to make to the way you are organized, feel free to do so between 
rounds. 
 
• When the 3-minute strategy session has been completed between rounds, each team will 
be notified and a new bag of device components will be placed on the table signifying the 
start of the next round.  This will continue until the 5th round is completed. 
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Production Process Moves Experiment 
No Template/Change High: “Red Go Kart” (4-person team) 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating in our experiments: 
 
• You will build the Lego Go Kart device 5 times, working together as a team. 
 
• Cost (completion time) and Quality (# of errors) are very important and will be tracked.  
Your objective is to build this device as quickly as possible with zero defects.  
Completion time will serve as a proxy for cost, so each round will be timed from start to 
finish.  “Finish” will be when your team has submitted the device for final inspection and 
there are no defects/errors.   
 
• When building the device, your team may organize your operation however you like.  To 
help facilitate this, you will be given 5 minutes before you begin the first round to 
organize. 
 
• In addition to your base pay, you can earn additional compensation each round if you are 
able to complete the device, without defects, in the following times: 
 
o > 8 minutes = $1 
o 7 to 8 minutes = $2 
o 6 to 7 minutes = $3 
o 5 to 6 minutes = $4 
o 4 to 5 minutes = $5 
o < 4 minutes = $6 
 
• Each round ends when the team has fully assembled the device.  Between rounds, your 
team will be given 3 minutes to strategize ways to improve your operation. If there are 
changes you want to make to the way you are organized, feel free to do so between 
rounds. 
 
• When the 3-minute strategy session has been completed between rounds, each team will 
be notified and a new bag of device components will be placed on the table signifying the 
start of the next round.  This will continue until the 5th round is completed. 
 
 
